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ABSTRACT 
 
Development of a Sustainable Water Resource Financing Mathematical Model for 
Donors and End-Users 
 
by 
 
Sahar B. Zavareh 
 
Dr. Pushkin Kachroo, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
 
Rural villages and underdeveloped communities represent the largest group 
challenged by poor water supply and sanitation with inequalities in resources to 
adequately implement potential solutions and even more with their high risk level 
of financing, funding is particularly challenging for water projects. Innovative 
financing alone will not eliminate the burdens of rural villages and underdeveloped 
communities. The purpose of this thesis is to address the lack of sustainable water 
financing of water projects in rural areas using a novel framework of a 
mathematical model based on “system dynamics” using optimal feedback control 
theory to maximize the performance of a water project. This is achieved by using 
feedback loops that allow for a real-time adjustment of the input parameters. The 
case model presented considers a renewable water supply system for a rural village 
where the user’s willingness to pay along with demand drive the performance 
indicators to simulate how decision makers can make real-time decisions on how to 
manage financing instruments and long-term debt. The results of the study are the 
first step to the mathematical framework of optimal control of cash flows. Future 
research is aimed at applying optimal control using ordinary differential equations 
and stochastic differential equations which is presented in theoretical form.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Water is the basis of life; central to the material and cultural well-being of 
societies worldwide (Shiva, 2002). Civilizations have risen and fallen with the 
changing water (Roy, 2011). Given that water is such a precious commodity to 
society, where less than two-thirds of the Earth’s surface covered by water, 
managing this finite resource is essential to our future well-being. Our water 
challenges lie within the lack of development in poor countries, rather than the 
absence of available water (Segerfeldt, 2005). These challenges arise with the 
inability to produce and distribute safe water in countries that lack sufficient 
infrastructure development (Segerfeldt, 2005). 
 
The most common water-uses consist of drinking, cooking, bathing, 
cleaning, and agricultural usage. The most crucial is domestic water use but 
industry consumes twice the amount than households (Cosgrove & Rijsberman, 
2000). There are one billion people without access to water within a 15-minute 
walk of their homes and 25 million people that die each year from contaminated 
water (Roddick, 2004). Currently there are more than 2 billion people that have no 
sanitation system (Frerot, 2011). Furthermore, the UN estimates that in less than 
20 years, 5 billion people will live in areas where it will be impossible or nearly 
impossible to collect water for basic sanitation, cooking, and drinking needs, if we 
continue with current water consumption trends (Roddick, 2004).  
 
In 2000 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which specified targets for sustainable 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation provisions for 2015 (UNDP, 
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2011). Much progress has been made but many countries still fall short of these 
goals. As we approach 2015, 235 million people will not meet the drinking water 
provisions and 700 million people from 74 countries will not achieve basic water 
sanitation (Frerot, 2011). 
 
1.1 Water Financing 
 
Water serves as a resource and a service which must be developed, 
managed, and distributed. Both the resource and service aspects require financing 
which is currently found to be deficient due to its lack of sustainability (Winpenny, 
2003). Water infrastructure is financed by three different sources: water users 
usually through some form of water billing arrangement, taxpayers, and aid donors. 
Financing water infrastructure requires monies to be spent on financing long-term 
physical assets. These include but are not limited to present cash flows or reserves 
on water projects or by loans or equity, which must be repaid by sources from 
users, taxpayers or donors (Winpenny, 2003). Sources of water funds (Winpenny, 
2003): 
 
- Water users 
- Informal suppliers 
- Public water authorities and utilities 
- Private companies 
- Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and local communities 
- Local banks and other financial institutions 
- International banks and export credit agencies 
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- International aid from multilateral and bilateral sources 
- Environmental and water funds 
- National central and local governments 
 
The discussions of financing water policies and water regimes have steadily 
been at the forefront of global environmental politics (Porter & Brown, 2006). A 
central concern to comply with obligations stipulated under environmental treaties 
or environmental projects, such as the MDGs, set to improve social and economic 
conditions in the world’s poorest countries, are the need for financial and technical 
assistance of water projects in developing countries. These challenges will be 
continually encountered throughout the debate of global environmental policy. 
Improving financial resources for advancing water infrastructures is a major 
obstacle of compliance for implementing water projects, as well as addressing the 
lack of financial and technical resources to fulfill project obligations, which are the 
key to project effectiveness (Porter & Brown, 2006). Ultimately, the success of 
water programs lies within innovative approaches to financing. 
 
Much debate has recently occurred over the role of donors in the water market, 
especially concerning the private sector which is presently involved in less than 
10% of the MDGs drinking water provisions (Frerot, 2011). Official development 
assistance (ODA) has been the principal source of funding for developing countries 
since World War II, especially in leveraging other financial flows such as bank 
loans or bond financing (Ketkar and Ratha, 2006). ODA has primarily been 
allocated in projects for water supply and sanitation projects of large systems and 
policies as shown in Figure 1 (Ketkar and Ratha, 2006). Examining how water 
projects are segmented based on credit risk potential exposes the limitations of 
available financing in the sector. Figure 2 points out the exposed areas of financing 
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not covered by the private sector of larger scale projects, where the risk associated 
is considered to be too high for investments and generally does not meet the 
guidelines of ODA investments. For smaller scale projects with high risks, 
microloans are the financing instrument utilized and are not considered for any 
other type of funding structure. The main objective of microfinance has been to 
improve and increase the flow of funds to high risk and low income clients in 
developing countries (Schicks and Rosenberg, 2011).   
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Breakdown of ODAs for Water by Project Type (Ketkar and Ratha, 
2006) 
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Figure 1.2. Water Projects Segmentation, Financing Options (Winpenny, 2003) 
 
 
“Developing countries have always looked for new and innovative ways of 
raising finance” (Ketkar & Ratha, 2009, p.2). When trying to understand the 
meaning of innovative financing there is no universal definition available. For this 
thesis the definition provided by the World Bank will be used (Sandor, Scott & 
Benn, 2009): 
 
“Innovative financing involves non-traditional applications of solidarity, 
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), and catalytic mechanisms that (i) 
support fundraising by tapping new sources and engaging investors beyond 
the financial dimension of transactions, as partners and stakeholders in 
development; or (ii) deliver financial solutions to development problems on 
the ground” (p.3). 
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The definition points out that the way we manage our water resources must 
include all the stakeholders, so that they, the investors and end-users, have the 
power to manage their own resources, respectively. Water financing should focus on 
being more responsive to all the stakeholders and not biased to just the investor or 
only the end-users, so that the projects can be more effective in distribution, 
management, and maintenance of the water resources. If there is a monetary stake, 
the water usage, service needs, and expectations of users will influence the financial 
instruments implemented in the project model. Empowering the communities to be 
a stakeholder can lead the way to improving designs and operations of local water 
resources, making them more sustainable. Because stakeholders have different 
stances on which they base terms set forth for financing, it is necessary to evaluate 
these conditions by each stakeholder in an effective model that can measure both 
the risk and financing terms.   
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Rural villages and underdeveloped communities represent a large portion of 
the population faced by the challenges of poor water supply and sanitation but 
vary widely amid economic resources and water resource models (Cardone and 
Fonseca, 2006). However, due to the high risk level of financing water projects in 
these communities, funding is particularly challenging. Additionally, many water 
projects have been found to lack sustainability. Water For People (WFP), an NGO 
aiming to address sustainable coverage of water and sanitation, found that as many 
as 50% of the Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) projects completed by all 
service and faith-based organizations have not demonstrated sustainability within 
five years of their completion, indicating that many WASH projects are not 
designed or implemented to be sustainable (WASRAG, 2008). Further research of 
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WFP in 2010 observed that “successful water and sanitation interventions actually 
get into the financial details that will influence supplies over time. Unfortunately 
most organizations shy away from this challenge because it is hard and time 
consuming. This is short sighted of course, and projects fail because NGOs dodge 
this hard work by making the case that communities suffer not just from water 
poverty but also from cashlessness in this particular paradigm” (Breslin, 2010 p. 
67).  
 
1.2 Purpose/Research Question 
The purpose of this thesis is to address the lack of sustainable water 
financing of water projects in rural areas by a novel framework. The proposed 
mathematical model is based on “system dynamics” and uses optimal feedback 
control theory to maximize the performance of a water project. This is achieved by 
using feedback loops that allow for a real-time adjustment of the input parameters.  
 
1.3 Scope 
The scope of this thesis is to: 
 
1. Assess all of the stakeholder’s willingness and ability to pay rather than 
idealistic projections and expectations to identify parameters to measure 
objectives of an ideal water project 
 
2. Target rural and underdeveloped communities 
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3. Focuses on borrower-lender financing strategies to optimize usage of 
funds to facilitate the definition of appropriate terms for water financed 
projects for an ideal return and success of the project for all stakeholders 
 
4. Demonstrate the need to integrate system dynamics with optimal control 
theory with feedback loops using ordinary differential equations or 
stochastic differential equations 
 
1.4 Objectives 
The objectives of this thesis are to: 
 
1. Propose a mathematical model as a basis of a theoretical framework for 
sustainable financing mechanisms of water projects funded by groups 
like NGOs, philanthropic donors, and investors 
1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
 The thesis is organized into seven chapters; examining the infrastructure of 
water financing for the development of the framework for the mathematic model in 
a system dynamics approach. 
 
1. Chapter 1 introduced the challenges of water financing in general and in 
particular pertaining to rural communities. It further discusses the objective 
of this thesis and current financing mechanisms of water projects to 
demonstrate the need for creating a sustainable and practical mathematical 
model for water financing. 
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2. Chapter 2 presents the examination of the stakeholders involved in the cash 
flow of monies distributed and financed for water projects. What are their 
objectives and interests in funding water projects? Evaluation of how to 
manage donor expectations without sacrificing the needs of the benefactors 
of these projects. 
 
3. Chapter 3 discusses and evaluates current financing structures of water 
projects. The applied financial instruments are examined in terms of their 
applicability, potential, and limitations for water financing. 
 
4. Chapter 4 assesses the benefactors of water projects financed by the donors 
discussed in Chapter 2. The benefactors are investigated with respect to 
weighing impact with long-term benefits and losses for stakeholders. 
 
5. Chapter 5 presents the framework of optimal water financing. Current water 
financing frameworks are reviewed and details of the proposed model are 
discussed. 
 
6. Chapter 6 demonstrates the functionality of the framework through analysis 
of a model case for which flexible financing terms that are measurable, 
clearly defined, and manage stakeholder expectations with appropriate time 
scales that are adjustable as needed to achieve objectives set forth by the 
project, are created. The results of the model results are discussed in detail. 
 
7. Chapter 7 summarizes the results of the research presented in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DONORS 
 
2.1 Background 
When examining the donor profiles of the water sector, there are two 
categories of financial support: Internal Financing Agencies (IFAs) and External 
Financing Agencies (EFAs). IFAs generally constitute of national governments 
whereas EFAs comprise of NGOs, charitable organizations, philanthropic donors, 
and investors (Hamdy, 2002). Donors aim to benefit rural and underdeveloped 
communities that focus on borrower-lender financing strategies to optimize the 
usage of funds. Donor investments in the water sector are provided in the following 
Figure 2.1. The figures represent financial contributions from major bilateral and 
multilateral donors of water supply, sanitation, irrigation and water resources 
(Hamdy, 2002). 
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Figure 2.1. Donor Investments in the Water Sector in bn US$ (Source: Hamdy, 
2002)  
 
 
A closer examination of where the funds derive in the water sector was 
conducted in the “Financing Water For All Report” chaired by Michel Camdessus. 
By assessing the source of funds the data and figures can be incorporated into an 
appropriate platform for the demand and supply side. The following is a 
breakdown of the water funds source analysis from the report (Winpenny, 2003): 
 
- Water users 
o Include households, farmers, and industry. Householder consumers in 
rural areas and especially in poorer urban districts invest available 
cash, labor, and materials in wells, pipes, essential sanitation, and 
other basic necessities. Farmers tend to invest largely in tubewells, 
pumps, and surface irrigation systems facilitated by member 
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associations and user groups. In some cases farmers can sell surpluses 
of water in the open market. Industry and business will commonly 
develop their own water supplies and treatment facilities, which in 
some cases support the local communities. Tariffs are also a form of 
water subsidy for water infrastructure to support the general 
population demands and supply.  
 
- Informal suppliers 
o Where there is a lack of infrastructure from the public services or 
investors, there are those that will provide water in bulk from 
tankers, containers and bottles. 
 
- Public water authorities and utilities 
o Consist of funds from regular spending and investments from 
revenues generated by user charges, loans or public subsidies. 
 
- Private companies 
o Include local or foreign funds from resources such as public utilities 
and equity investments. 
 
- Non-governmental organizations and local communities 
o These groups raise funds from private contributions, donations or 
grants. 
 
- Local banks and other financial institutions 
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o These institutions offer short-term (up to three years) to medium-
term (three to ten years) loans at market rates. 
 
- International banks and export credit agencies 
o Provide larger capacities of finance than traditional local 
establishments that entail corporate guarantees or projected cash 
flow analysis. 
 
- International aid from multilateral and bilateral sources 
o Consist of loans based on concessional terms or grants. 
 
- Multilateral Financial Institutions 
o Consist of loans with near-market terms. 
 
- Environmental and water funds 
o Contain a variety of expenditures such as earmarked tax funds, 
directed credit funds, and green funds. 
 
- National central and local governments 
o Provide subsidies, guarantees of loans, and proceeds of bond issues. 
 
The water sector tends to generally obtain funds through government 
budgets which are the largest contributors, development agencies which consist of 
bilateral, multilateral and NGOs along with domestic based private operators and 
a limited amount from the international private sector (Cardone and Fonseca, 
2006). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
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created the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to measure international 
aid flow. The official DAC for Official Development Assistance (ODA) specifies 
“money flows to countries on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing 
countries) and to multilateral institutions for flows to Part I aid recipients” 
(Clermont, 2006). The ODA is provided by agencies, state, and local governments 
or by third parties involved in distribution of funds. Each transaction must meet 
two conditions: 
 
a. The transaction is administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; 
and 
 
b. Is given special consideration and contains a grant element higher than 
25% (calculated at a discount rate of 10 per cent). The definition of a 
grant element is calculated as “the difference between the face value of 
the loan and the discounted present value of the service payments the 
borrower will make over the lifetime of the loan, expressed as a 
percentage of the face value” (Clermont, 2006). 
 
2.2 ODA Source of Funds 
ODA is made up of grants and concessional loans to support socio-economic 
development from a government of a donor country directly to a developing 
country or a multilateral agency. A significant issue in the development of 
cooperation of this aid is the allocation of ODA and the classification by region, 
country, sector or focus area. Donors’ allocations largely are directed by their 
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governing policy resulting in conservative allocations, where established obligations 
tend to stay at same levels with limited changes through small adjustments 
(OECD, 2009). 
 
ODA can be in the form of a bilateral or multilateral transaction. For a 
transaction to be considered bilateral it must remain under control of two parties: 
the donor country and the recipient country. An exception is made when the aid is 
passed through NGOs or international aid organizations but is under the control of 
the donor country. Unlike a bilateral contribution of two parties, a multilateral 
ODA consists of donations from OEDC member countries to international 
organizations working with the recipient country for aid, where they may provide 
all or part of the activities involved with the aid (Clermont, 2006). 
 
ODA multilateral sources relatively stayed at 600 million dollars through 
the late 1990s which began to rise and accounted for 85% of commitments until the 
mid-1990s. An increase of multilateral grants is the most recent trend in 
multilateral grants. ODA for water funded by multilateral aid commitments was 
25% at the beginning of the 1990s but has gradually risen to 30% of late, which 
indicates a change in policy of donors moving from bilateral policies and supporting 
more efforts of international institutions in the water sector (Clermont, 2006). 
 
There have also been bilateral aid increases in commitments from 1.9 billion 
dollars in 1990 to 2.4 billion dollars in 2002 (Clermont, 2006). Many bilateral 
grants are outpacing the issuance of bilateral loans, which indicates that grant 
terms are more favorable for lender-borrowers than loans. These trends can be 
observed of bilateral and multilateral commitments in the following figure:  
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Figure 2.2. Bilateral and Multilateral Annual ODA Commitments for Water as 
Loans and Grants (5-year moving average in 2003 constant dollars) (Source: 
Clermont, 2006  
 
When reviewing the donor countries of ODA in Figure 2.3, seventy percent 
of the water aid comes from only 5 donors: Japan, IDA, Germany, United States, 
and France (OECD, 2009).  
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 Commitments, 
USD million 
% of Donor 
Total 
% All Donors Disbursements, 
USD million 
 03-04 05-06 07-08 05-06 07-08 05-06 07-08 05-06 07-08 
Australia 40.4 7.5 17.4 1 1 0 0 24.8 15 
Austria 26.4 22.6 31.3 7 8 0 0 16.8 20.7 
Belgium 27.3 76 99.5 8 8 1 1 48.4 52.2 
Canada 122 35.9 35.8 2 1 1 0 63.5 42.2 
Denmark 201.9 150.2 26.8 11 3 2 0 122.9 100 
Finland 12.7 53.5 42.3 10 8 1 1 9.2 27 
France 232.1 224.1 387.2 4 6 3 5 233.3 182.4 
Germany 493.8 538 770.9 9 10 8 11 432.7 510.4 
Greece 1.8 1 1.9 1 1 0 0 1 1.9 
Ireland 25 19.8 23.3 5 4 0 0 19.8 23.3 
Italy 42.8 76.8 112.7 9 13 1 2 40.8 37.9 
Japan 911.8 1800.1 1922.5 20 17 26 27 721.6 1078.9 
Luxembourg 17.9 15.2 16.7 9 9 0 0 15.2 16.7 
Netherlands 171.1 400.6 383.4 10 11 6 5 151.6 297.8 
New Zealand 2.1 4.7 1.6 2 1 0 0 2.9 2.9 
Norway 31.8 49.2 48.3 2 2 1 1 46.9 48.4 
Portugal 1.5 1.9 1 1 0 0 0 1.9 1 
Spain 96.2 70.7 370.2 4 12 1 5 78.6 346.8 
Sweden 62.9 113.9 67.3 5 5 2 1 77 66.5 
Switzerland 42 60.2 41.8 7 5 1 1 41.5 44.5 
United 
Kingdom 66 116.9 209.6 3 3 2 3 79.3 128.6 
United States 596.2 948.7 644.1 5 3 14 9 1057.6 397.2 
Total DAC 
Countries 3225.7 4787.7 5255.5 8 7 69 73 3287.3 3442.3 
AfDF 191.9 299.6 271.1 22 19 4 4 74.6 173.1 
AsDF 178 224.3 141.1 17 9 3 2 .. .. 
EU 
Institutions 495.8 877.3 377 8 3 13 5 385.8 447.1 
IDA 939.4 739.4 1107.5 11 11 11 15 683.3 731.7 
IDB Sp.Fund 0 25.6 32.8 6 12 0 0 .. .. 
IFAD 4.8 7.1 2.9 2 1 0 0 .. .. 
GEF .. .. 1.4 .. 1 .. 0 .. 1.4 
UNDP 3.4 2.2 2.1 0 0 0 0 2.2 1.5 
UNICEF 21.4 25 43.7 5 6 0 1 25 43.7 
UNECE .. .. 0.7 .. 7 .. 0 .. 0.7 
Total 
Multilateral 1834.7 2200.5 1980.3 10 8 31 27 1170.9 1399.3 
Total 5060.4 6988.1 7235.8 8 7 100 100 4458.2 4841.7 
Figure 2.3. ODA Commitments by Countries and Amounts (Source: OECD, 2010) 
 
The amount of ODA allocated for the water sector per capita appears to be 
determined by three principal factors (Clermont, 2006): 
 
• The demographic weight of the country: ODA is representative of a 
relationship between the borrower and lender, where the number of projects 
is not proportional to the population of the country. The data reflects that 
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for a heavily populated country, there is less ODA for water per capita 
distribution. 
 
• The economic and political stability of the country: There is a minimum 
level of political and economic stability required for the country to receive 
funding because of the long-term commitment and scope of the project. 
 
• Geopolitical objectives: The concerns of the donor countries are founded 
on the geostrategies of the recipient country as well as the prior and 
geographical relations between donors and recipients. 
 
2.3 What is the private sector? 
The private sector contains a wide range of individuals and groups, even 
though they do not provide official development assistance, they act as service and 
funding providers that include for-profit private sectors, foundations, NGOs, 
voluntary aid, and support, as well as private academia groups (OECD, 2011). 
With the development of private foundations playing an increasing role in the 
financing arena, it is necessary to bring the public and private sectors together 
through mechanisms such as public-private partnerships. There is an emerging 
recognition of the private sectors role in creating income growth and poverty 
reduction within partner countries to improve frameworks for financing (OECD, 
2011). 
 
There are currently no exact figures of the private flows in the marketplace.  
The OECD DAC collects data on grants by private voluntary agencies, private 
flows at market terms, and bilateral ODA through NGOs. According to 2007 data, 
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the scale of development operations of the world’s foundation is roughly USD 5 
billion annually, with US-based foundations playing the major role, European-
Asian foundations contributing as well with an estimation of international grants 
by the European foundation of 600 million USD annually and 400 million USD 
annually for Asian foundations (OECD, 2011). The following Table 2.2 is the latest 
tracking of private flows published by the OECD in June 2011.  
 
 
Grants by Private Voluntary Agencies (Total 
DAC countries) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
14,712 14,648 17,866 23,655  
 
Private Flows at Market Terms (long-term)  
(1 to 4) (Total DAC countries) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
179,559  194,761  312,475 121,224  
1. Direct investment 100,622  127,925  180,293 178,140  
2. Private export credits 5,563 3,137 13,161 6,572 
3. Securities of multilateral agencies 40 2,789 -9,737 -9,983 
4. Bilateral portfolio investment 73,335  60,910 128,759 -53,504    
 
Bilateral ODA: Grants and grant-like 
contributions of which are contributions to 
NGOs (Total DAC countries) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
1,017 1,779 2,037 2,516 
Figure 2.4. Data on Private Flows in USD Millions (Source: OECD, 2011) 
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2.4 Other Funding Sources 
Other sources of funding considered by the water sector include: (OECD, 2009) 
 
 Global taxes on currency transactions and energy use. 
 
 Voluntary private sector contributions through donations, global 
lotteries, premium bonds or global funds. 
 
 The International Finance Facility, which set up a pilot program 
on immunization in January 2006 with the support of France, Italy, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Solidarity taxes 
on air tickets. Currently nine countries have adopted this tax, and 
the proceeds are mainly used to fund accelerated access to 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria drugs through other aid 
organizations. 
 
 Advanced Market Commitments to provide incentives for the 
development of vaccines important to developing countries. 
 
 Sovereign wealth funds, established either from export receipts 
earned from a nonrenewable resource or from very high corporate 
or household saving rates and surpluses. These funds could become 
major sources of development finance. 
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2.5 Donor Objectives and Interest in Funding Water Projects 
Much of the donor base for OAD is rooted in the foundation of improving 
water supply and sanitation in line with the MDGs, targeting countries most in 
need (OECD and WWC, 2008). However, donors choose different reasons for such 
aid that can be as simple as wanting to improve the borrower’s economic 
development whether it is to further their own political, strategic or commercial 
interests, maintaining historical and cultural ties, or to demonstrate their 
humanitarian aid (World Bank, 1985). Humanitarian aid can be in the form of 
interventions to save lives in an emergency context that can pertain to water, 
health and education that is not factored as OAD contributions (OECD and 
WWC, 2008). These objectives can affect how aid is given as well as reduce the 
effectiveness of financial flows promoting development (World Bank, 1985). 
 
A study published by the World Bank in the 1980s observed the role of non-
development considerations in determining ODA distributions. These results 
showed that DAC donors generally required the recipient or borrower to purchase 
goods and services from the donor country, whereby 43 percent of aid given in the 
form of “tying” was bilateral ODA and another 11 percent was partially tied 
(World Bank, 1985). The World Bank acknowledged in their findings that the 
percentages reported were most likely understated as to the volume of actual tied 
aid. The implications of these ties suggested in their findings that the value of the 
loans were reduced by 15 to 20 percent but was more likely a higher percentage 
unaccounted, which intern reduced the quality of goods and services, higher and 
inefficient given the true needs of the borrower (World Bank, 1985). 
 
Financial flows that contribute to water infrastructure investments can have 
benefits with the private sector and should not be overlooked because of 
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inefficiencies of existing financial structures. Governments have used private 
businesses to improve the access of water and sanitation services and experience 
has shown that when the goals are managed among stakeholders that these 
partnerships can overcome obstacles and achieve results (Payen, 2006). 
 
2.6 How to Manage Donor Expectations 
In discussing how to manage donor expectations within financing structures, 
it is imperative to have new and existing donors with the coordination of the 
borrowers and aid recipients to bring forth the discussions of funding, planning, 
management and reporting systems to achieve the goals of the agreed upon water 
project. These concerns are not just limited to the water sector and financing. In 
examining the Global Fund that was established in 2002 to address health issues of 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and its designs of internal controls and 
management systems of the funds infrastructure, participants acknowledged that it 
had a high profile in servicing the recipients of aid to undertake the objectives of 
the fund. However, these challenges of managing expectations were magnified by 
the effect of weak health systems, limited capacity, and competing demands for 
governments, partners and for the Global Fund itself (Brugha et al, 2004). There is 
a need for transparent dialogue between stakeholders in managing expectations 
with not only donors but all interested parties. 
 
 23 
 
CHAPTER 3 
FINANCIAL STRUCTURES 
 
There are four traditional forms of financing instruments used in the water 
sector: grants, loans, equity, and debt (GTZ, 2006). The following forms are 
defined as followed adapted from the “Financing Infrastructure in the Water and 
Wastewater Sector” report compiled by GTZ: 
 
• Grants: Facilitated through public budgets. Primary funders are 
international donors to national governments to fund water sector 
development. In turn national governments disperse the grant for national 
sector priorities or allocate funds to local governments or utilities. 
 
• Loans: Distributed to parties involved in the water sector from donors or 
private investors through the banking system (national and international). 
 
• Equity and Debt: Funds generated through the capital market facilitated 
by private investors, governments and International Finance Institution 
(IFIs) where they are allocated to municipalities or utilities in the water 
sector. Donors have played a limited role in the use of equity and debt 
instruments; however they are increasing their profile in these areas. 
 
A breakdown of the sources of water sector financing mechanisms is further 
illustrated in the following figure. 
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Sources of Finance 
Instruments 
Intermediaries 
Instruments 
Users of Finance 
Instruments 
Donors and IFIs 
 Grants 
 Loans 
 
Private Investors 
 Loans 
 Debt/equity 
 
Public-Private partnerships 
 Grants 
 Loans 
 Debt/equity 
Public budgets 
(budgetary finance) 
 
Banking system 
(bank lending) 
 
Insurance market 
(risk guarantee schemes) 
Guarantees 
 
Capital market 
(Investment agencies) 
National governments 
 Grants 
 Loans 
 
Municipal governments 
 Grants 
 Loans 
 Debt/equity 
 
Utilities 
 Grants 
 Loans 
 Debt/equity 
 Tariff revenue 
Table 3.1 Sources of Water Sector Financing Mechanisms (Source: GTZ, 2006) 
 
 
A range of potential sources of financing and instruments is listed for potential 
ways of meeting the demands of the lender-borrowers in the water sector (Cardone 
and Fonseca, 2006) 
 
- User fees or tariffs 
- Domestic taxes 
- Grants 
- Loans 
- Micro-credit/micro-finance 
- Environmental charges 
- Dedicated or special purpose fund 
- Bond markets 
- Equity 
- Direct private investment 
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- Mixed credits and export funds 
- Voluntary finance schemes 
- Guarantees 
- Debt swaps 
 
Most of these arrangements are based on the premise that the cost of recovery 
will be absorbed from user’s representative of residential, commercial, industrial or 
from the government. In order for the recipient to obtain funding they must 
demonstrate credit worthiness, whereby they are required to exhibit appropriate 
governance structures, recordkeeping of accounting, and financial documents, 
historical cash flows, establish the means to manage the debt with past 
performance along with any other economic considerations placed by the donor 
(Cardone and Fonesca, 2006). 
 
When there is a lack of adequate funding due to these financial barriers it can 
create unintended consequences in the water markets. This is classified as the 
“vicious downward spiral” by the CEO Panel (2003) and illustrated in the following 
figure. 
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Figure 3.1. Vicious Downward Spiral (Source: Moss et al, 2003) 
 
 
Donors have various instruments available for financing, but primarily use 
grants and loans. Additionally, donors can enter into a type of PPP providing 
financing together with a private source. For the water sector specifically, 72% of 
ODA financing comes from grants whereas the remaining 28% are derived from 
loans (GTZ, 2006). From the donors reviewed in Chapter 2, Germany and France 
are the predominant providers of loan ODA in the water sector. From the total 
amount of loans provided between the period of 1997-2001, France provided 58%, 
while Germany provided 36% (Clermont, 2006).  
 
The majority of loans provided are for large-scale water supply and 
sanitation projects. 72% of all loans provided between 1997 and 2001 were for 
large-scale water supply and sanitation projects. While EC, Belgium, and Italy 
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provided 100% of their loans for large-scale water supply and sanitation, and 100% 
of loans from Spain were for water resources protection, France and Germany 
provided loans to several sub-sectors such as small scale water supply and 
sanitation, water resources management, river development, and agricultural water 
resources, among others (GTZ, 2006). 
 
There are many benefits of having donors provide financing opportunities 
and assistance to other countries or groups in need. These benefits of foreign 
assistance range from providing a constructive policy dialogue of policy changes, 
promoting sufficient development, to facilitating financing in the markets (GTZ, 
2006). As discussed in Chapter 2, the foreign assistance provided by donors can 
create certain amount of dependence which is a negative incentive for donors to 
promote self-sustainable solutions for the future. Focus should be given on 
emphasizing policy reforms, developing flexible financing instruments that meet 
precise objectives of the end-users and coordinate joint efforts as much as possible 
where available (World Bank, 1985).  
 
There is a movement by donors to reform their lending and financing 
policies to expand financing options available to developing markets by suggesting 
innovative and new financing tools. Other alternative financing policies include 
using local banks as co-financers or intermediaries to improve the banking sector 
and build financial capacity. The World Bank and IFC have created a Bank-IFC 
Municipal Fund to assist in lending at the sub-sovereign level that does not require 
sovereign guarantees (GTZ, 2006). 
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3.1 Private Investment 
The private finance water sector investment potential tends to be higher in 
larger population centers where the risk is perceived to be much less when 
considering the recovery cost of the venture. Areas of population under 500 that 
are considered rural, household finance and microfinance are the preferred financing 
option over traditional private financing because of the small size and scope of the 
project (Baletti and Raymond, 2005). Some of the reasons for PPPs lack of 
investments were compiled by the World Bank. It was noted that even though 
more attractive investments may be presented to the private sector they generally 
still will not materialize based on risk profiles and observance of market principles 
chosen by the PPP.  One reason cited by the World Bank was the preference of 
PPPs having a strong bias for large size projects with high transaction costs. Other 
considerations by PPPs included country settings and business climate conditions 
where favor is given to countries with adequate sovereign risk ratings (Baletti and 
Raymond, 2005). 
 
From the report compiled by the World Bank, the following were listed as 
reasons for lack of PPP in markets and is provided (Baletti and Raymond, 2005): 
 
 Capital intensity, with high, up-front investments combined with long 
payback periods and low sector returns 
 
 Risk of political pressure on tariffs 
 
 Weak or inconsistent regulation, lack of transparency, and perceived risk of 
regulatory capture 
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 Sub-sovereign risk – local government entities standing counterparty to bulk 
water sale agreements while having a poor collection records, suboptimal 
financial conditions, and weak credit 
 
 Water unaccounted for, water loss, inadequate distributions networks in a 
state of disrepair, and the lack of investment funding to remedy the same 
thus threatening long0term project viability 
 
 Foreign exchange risk, with mismatch between local currency revenues and 
foreign currency financing 
 
 Forms of credit backstop (for example, sovereign counter-guarantees for 
financial obligations of subnational entities being scaled back in the face of 
decentralization, ratings agencies reviews and downgrades) 
 
 Lack of local government access to bank and capital markets due to absence 
of central government authorization, and competition for scarce financial 
resources 
 
 Aversion of private insurers and reinsurers to providing bond insurance and 
political risk insurance to subnational entities in developing countries due to 
lack of transparency, poor financial condition of reference entity, and 
absence of credit rating. 
 
In taking a closer look at financing potential in the private water markets, we 
can observe the highest investments currently are needed in the rural and village 
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communities (Baletti and Raymond, 2005). This is illustrated by the World Bank’s 
Figure (Figure 3.2) for private sector potential in different water markets. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Private Sector Potential in Different WSS Markets. (Source: Baletti 
and Raymond, 2005) 
 
 
3.2 Innovative Financing – Looking Beyond Traditional Financing Flows 
There is a need to manage existing and potential resources in a sustainable 
manner that is accountable and manageable by all the stakeholders. What drives 
innovative financing is the need for new financial resources and effective use of 
those resources.  
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The concept of innovative financing in the marketplace has recently emerged as 
a creative way to meet the shortfalls of existing investment structures.  It 
addresses the question of who can provide financing as well as how financing can 
be supplied and demanded. The World Bank defines innovative financing as an 
approach that meets three conditions (World Bank, 2010): 
 
1. Generation of additional development funds by seeking new funding sources 
or engaging with new partners 
 
2. Enhancing the efficiency of financial flows that reduce delivery time and/or 
costs, specifically for emergency needs and crisis situations; and  
 
3. Creating more results-oriented financial flows that link funding flows to 
measurable performance on the ground  
 
These concepts are illustrated in Figure 3.3, showing the overlapping 
opportunities of funding in the water market sector. By understanding these 
overlapping opportunities there can be more effective dialogue between 
stakeholder’s negotiations of the financial structures implemented for water 
projects. These understandings are critical in designing the most appropriate and 
efficient financing mechanisms that will mutually benefit the stakeholders. 
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Figure 3.3. Innovating Financing Role for Water Projects (Source: World Bank, 
2010) 
 
 
The use of innovation has the ability to reduce pressures of existing resources 
facilitating sustainable principals (Hemmelskamp, Rennings, & Leone, 2000). 
Sources of potential innovative financing can include the following (Cardone and 
Fonesca, 2006): 
 
- PRSC 
- Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) 
- MDG-based Planning 
- SWAP (donor funding) 
- Domestic financial intermediary  
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o Local Banking Sector 
o Microfinance  
o Credit Cooperatives 
- Public Sector Financial Agencies 
o Public Banks issuing loans to municipalities 
 
In assessing the most practical and efficient financing strategy that is 
sustainably viable, we can look towards the World Bank’s assessment of indicators 
in the public and private sector to understand borrower’s options. Figure 3.4 
illustrates these options at the various levels of PPP financing. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Financing Options at Different Levels of Financial Sustainability 
(Source: Baletti and Raymond, 2005) 
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We can use Table 3.2 to summarize the applied financial instruments of 
their applicability and ideal targets for water projects.  It is important to 
determine these factors so that they are not overlooked in available financing or 
concerns of the PPP sector, which then can contribute to designing stakeholder 
perspectives for tasked to address all the likely challenges facing stakeholders. 
These concerns should not be limited to just only these concerns, but rather 
initiate the discussion of all potential concerns in question.  
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Financing Instruments Appropriate for What Local Conditions Target (water user, 
national/local 
government, community, 
utility, etc.) 
Grants 
Non-performing utilities; absence of local 
financial market; weak national government 
with limited fiscal decentralization. Grant 
financing best used as a tool to support the 
involvement of the poor, to build capacity for 
sub-sovereign and private sector water actors; 
provide initial start-up capital for community 
funds, revolving loans and other types of 
funds for the water sector. 
Local government; 
utility 
Donor loans 
Can be applied to many actors within a 
country in different ways. 
Innovative: loans to sub-sovereigns or private 
sector (particularly to build commercial or 
institutional lending capacity)’ lending in local 
currency 
National and municipal 
governments 
Bank loans 
Stable financial market with clear legal 
framework and repayment capacity of 
borrower; regulatory body to ensure effective 
tariffs; stable utility balance sheet 
National and municipal 
governments 
Micro-finance loans 
Community participation and capacity-
building; provision of start-up capital; 
community monitoring 
Local community utility; 
user 
Equity 
Can be applied only to a public LTD or 
private utility – need a shareholder board in 
place. Fiscal decentralization, stable or 
developing financial market with clear legal 
framework 
Utility 
Municipal Bonds 
Sufficient debt capacity of local government; 
security mechanism for purchasers of bond 
(guarantee mechanism development of 
secondary market to sell bond for example); 
capacity in municipality to successfully design 
and administer bond; minimum municipal 
credit rating BBB of higher, positive market 
conditions 
Municipal government 
Private finance (loans, 
debt or equity) 
Sound legal and regulatory framework; 
guarantee schemes to protect investors; 
guarantees against sovereign risk, foreign 
exchange risk; low transaction cost thresholds; 
capacity-building of domestic private sector in 
some cases; stability cash flow 
Local government; 
utility 
Pooled financing and 
revolving funds 
Pooling is favorable where conditions are not 
yet ripe for commercial lending or private 
investors, as individual company balance 
sheets may be weak. Need a project planning 
cycle in place; clear default and loan 
guidelines; combination of stronger and 
weaker borrowers; initial start-up capital for 
loan 
Local governments 
Guarantees 
Guarantees for agencies to work in higher risk 
projects/sectors; guarantees and lines of credit 
to domestic banks (could be provided from 
donor finance, private sector, national 
government, etc.) as well as private sector to 
encourage involvement sector 
Private sector, banks 
Table 3.2. Summary of Applied Financial Instruments and Applicability (Source: 
GTZ, 2006) 
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CHAPTER 4 
END-USERS, RECIPIENTS AND BORROWERS 
 
Local communities and groups have the most at stake with water resources 
and the underlying theme is effective management to their overall sustainability 
(Brooks, 2002). Individuals, villages, communities, and governments are necessary 
stakeholders to establish efficient, equitable and sustainable water resource 
management. When providing basic water services such as water supply, 
sanitation, waste treatment, and sewage for urban and rural areas, it will begin 
with the end-users and communities (Van Hofwegen, 2006). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, donors have tasked themselves to meet the challenges of the MDGs set 
forth by the UNDEP for water compiled in 2003. 
 
 
 Water Sanitation 
UN global estimate of 
those without access 
1.2 billion 2.5 billion 
By 2015, this number 
would grow to at least 
1.5 billion 3 billion 
The International 
Development Target is to 
reduce this by half by 
2015 
750 million 1.5 billion 
This means that each year 
for the next 13 years, the 
following have to be 
connected 
57.692 million 115.385 million 
This means that roughly 
each day for the next 13 
years, the following have 
to be connected 
158,601 316,122 
Table 4.1. Targets to meet Millennium Development Goals (Source: Moss et al, 
2003) 
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From the review of donors in Chapter 2, the majority of ODA commitments 
of water investments are mainly derived from bilateral donors. Of the list compiled 
by the OECD of the 30 donors, 60% of monies stem from four donors and 80% 
originates from eight donors. Figure 4.2 is the analysis of ODA recipients from 
donors distributed aid from 1990-2004 (Van Hofwegen, 2006). 
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India 62 126 11 2 5 1 - 19 2 19 10 257 8,1 
China 146 36 15 0,3 12 2 - 5 3 4 28 251 8,0 
Egypt 15 5 15 77 19 4 - 7 4 10 11 168 5,3 
Vietnam 34 47 5 0,03 7 0,1 29 5 6 0,4 17 150 4,8 
Indonesia 75 - 4 0,2 3 2 - 6 1 0,1 13 104 3,3 
Turkey 50 - 30 0,03 7 5 - - - - 0,5 102 3,2 
Morocco 17 - 24 1 19 18 - 0,003 - - 4 83 2,6 
Palest. Adm. 
Areas 
3 1 12 39 4 3 - 1 - 3 6 71 2,3 
Philippines 56 - 2 0,4 1 - 4 1 2 - 3 69 2,2 
Jordan 8 - 20 29 2 1 - 0,1 - 1 4 66 2,1 
Bangladesh 4 18 0,1 2 2 0,1 9 9 10 6 5 65 2,1 
Ghana 4 21 5 0,1 3 3 - 3 11 6 10 65 2,1 
Peru 44 - 13 0,2 2 0,002 - 0,3 - 0,1 3 62 2,0 
Iraq 0,01 - 0,2 57 - 1 - 0,1 0,1 1 3 61 1,9 
Pakistan 9 16 2 0,02 3 0,3 26 1 - 1 2 61 1,9 
Sri Lanka 28 5 2 0,02 2 - 15 0,2 3 1 2 57 1,8 
Tunisia 17 - 19 - 14 3 - 1 - - 1 54 1,7 
Tanzania 2 9 8 0,03 1 3 - 4 4 1 19 50 1,6 
Thailand 45 - 0,3 0,04 0,2 - - 0,0002 1 0,1 1 47 1,5 
Mexico 43 - 0,1 0,04 0,2 - - - - 0,1 2 45 1,5 
Others (154 
recipients) 
251 161 156 21 107 111 32 46 43 31 298 1226 1,4 
Total 912 445 362 229 211 157 115 108 90 84 443 3156 40,1 
Percentage 28,9 14,1 11,5 7,3 6,7 5,0 3,7 3,4 2,8 2,7 14,0   
Table 4.2. Principal Donors and Recipients of ODA for Water, in Average Annual 
Commitments for the Period 1990-2004 (millions of 2003 constant US 
Dollars)(Source: Van Hofwegen, 2006) 
 
            
 38 
 
 
                                                                        
In assessing the perceptions of the needs and wants of the end-users or 
recipients of water it becomes evident that the more successful the good or service 
is delivered, the higher the probability it will be taken for granted (Moss et al, 
2003). A Maslow hierarchy of needs was constructed by the CEO Panel in 2003 
and the following Figure 4.3 illustrates the water needs of users. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. What People Want with Water (Source: Moss et al, 2003) 
 
 
Given that the value of water will vary from use, to users, and places, 
market values are not the same as pricing because people will always have different 
values. These differences of values range from small to large known as “value 
divides” (Moss et al, 2003). These value divides between stakeholders are 
important, because they must be aligned in some manner, if sustainable water 
management solutions are to be found. By understanding that solutions that do 
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not all have a consensus will not prevail in the long-term, because stakeholders will 
undermine the process along with political shifts (Moss et al, 2003).  The way 
people value water is based on a variety of factors that constantly evolve and 
necessitate collaboration between the stakeholders (Brooks, 2002). 
 
Using a full-cost approach to pricing of water infrastructure, that is, the 
consumers are charged the full cost of water services from use to collection, 
treatment and wastewater disposal to recognize the full value of water with the 
cost of externalities should be developed based on the stakeholder’s valuation of 
water and overall objectives of the project (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000). It was 
noted in the proceedings of a local workshop in Katmandu in financing water 
harvesting schemes that users themselves were obligated to provide funds for local 
construction whether by contributions of cash, in-kind, or labor for the project and 
often times were built by the users themselves. The maintenance and organizations 
would then fall to the responsibility of the users as well (Banskota and Chalise, 
2000). “This approach to valuing water will encourage infrastructure investments 
and private sector involvement and provide the revenue to cover the costs of 
operation and maintenance” (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000, p. 2). 
 
There is no practical sense of a “best practice” policy for water resource 
management. “This is because the world is heterogeneous, with different cultures, 
social norms, climatic patterns, skewed availability of water and financial resources, 
management capacities, institutional structures and levels of corruption” 
(Tortajada and Biswas, 2011, p.9). Given that these values vary amid stakeholders 
in varying degrees, it is fundamental to construct a framework to conceive these 
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values. The CEO Panel (2003) designed a “water dialogue space” pattern 
representing the value perspectives and stakeholders to aid in the construction of 
identifying common ground for value differences and divides (Moss et al, 2003) as 
illustrated in Figure 4.2 and 4.3. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Dialogue Space and Value Perspectives (Source: Moss et al, 2003) 
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Figure 4.3. Dialogue Space and Stakeholders (Source: Moss et al, 2003) 
 
 
The panel furthered the pattern with a stakeholder mapping progression for 
stimulating the process of valuing water and water governance amongst the water 
sector. The first step in the blueprint is to identify water users where the services 
and activities can then be outlined. The third step identifies the subject to ideas 
and prevailing interests of the stakeholders. These spheres are overlapping and can 
identify potential challenges of conflict, improve dialogue discussions and 
strengthen common interests amongst the stakeholders. The last step of the system 
yields shared outcomes for society, environment, and economy, which are essential 
to sustainable development. This platform provides a framework for identifying the 
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relative rights, roles and responsibilities of stakeholders when addressing water 
challenges (Moss et al, 2003). 
 
 
 Users / Customers 
Domestic 
Industrial 
Commercial 
Agriculture 
Etc. 
   
Organiser/Governor 
Mayor 
Municipal Administration 
Regulators 
State Authorities 
Etc. 
 Operator/Supplier 
Employees 
Subcontractors 
Suppliers 
Financiers 
Etc. 
Figure 4.4. Mapping Stakeholders – Step 1 (Source: Moss et al, 2003) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Mapping Stakeholders – Step 2. (Source: Moss et al, 2003) 
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Figure 4.6. Mapping Stakeholders – Step 3. (Source: Moss et al, 2003) 
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Figure 4.7. Mapping Stakeholders – Step 4. (Source: Moss et al, 2003) 
 
 
It has been observed by the International Development Research Centre 
(IDRC) that “smaller and less complicated approaches are more likely to be 
adopted and put to lasting use than grand designs of integrated resource 
management” (Brooks, 2002). 
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CHAPTER 5 
HOW TO OPTIMIZE WATER FINANCING 
 
Water crisis historically is viewed from the imbalance of water supply and 
demand but should include the pervasive gaps of economic and institutional 
dimensions of water resource development, allocation, use, and management to 
properly design, initiate, and sustain these changes within the ongoing debate of 
water, both nationally and internationally (Saleth and Dinar, 2004). ODA has 
faced trends of losses in the 1990s after gains in the 1970s and 1990s and recent 
gains in 2000. The following Figure5.1 demonstrates these trends for the period 
between 1971 and 2006: 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. Official development assistance in billion $ to the water supply and 
sanitation sector from 1971 to 2006. (Source: UNESCO, 2009) 
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These economic trends of increases and declines result from the inefficient 
use of water resources, poor management, and water shortages along with the 
increasing environmental and financial costs associated with managing water 
(Saleth and Dinar, 2004). Even if new solutions were applied such as technology, it 
still is not enough to overcome the challenges in the current models of water 
resource management (Frerot, 2011). Given that the financial and economic 
contributions largely contribute to the success in this sector, the answers lie within 
the framework of water policies, water technology, and water financing which 
shape the design and implementation of the water resources (Saleth and Dinar, 
2004). In the following, three currently used frameworks for water projects are 
reviewed and a novel framework for sustainable water financing is proposed. 
 
5.1 Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) 
IWRM is a decision making tool for development and management of water 
resources for a variety of uses, that takes into account the needs and desires of 
numerous stakeholders and users, giving governance and sustainability of water 
systems (Van Hofwegen and Jaspers, 1999).  It was developed by the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) to address financing issues, which have been 
largely overlooked by literature in the water governance and sector development. 
(Rees, Winpenny and Hall, 2008). The analytical framework of IRWM is presented 
in Figure 5.1. It has been proposed that, feedback loops should be used to include 
interaction with finance, where considerations are made with whom and how to 
finance for the present and the future. Presently finance is considered a missing 
component of IWRM plans or is referenced for increased demands, when the 
argument could be made that every country or benefactor has the need for 
additional financing (Rees, Winpenny and Hall, 2008). Infrastructure planning that 
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gives consideration to the dynamics of financing will be more likely to generate 
adequate funding and maintain the credibility amongst constituents. The 
framework presented in this thesis was therefore tailored to be able to allow for 
dynamic and flexible financing in order to resolve the challenges of current water 
financing.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Analytical Framework for Integrated Water Resource Management 
(IWRM). (Source: Van Hofwegen and Jaspers, 1999) 
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5.2 OECD 
The OECD is claimed to be the most experienced international organization 
with financing strategies in the water sector since the 1990s and has been at the 
forefront of these discussions at conferences, publishing books, and policy briefs on 
the matter (COWI, 2007).  For the purposes of this thesis, the OECD water 
financing applied framework and methodology will be examined as the foundation 
for the qualitative framework proposed in this chapter.  
 
5.2.1 SMART TARGETS 
The OECD created a financing strategy that established SMART: Specific, 
Measureable, Agreed, Realistic and Time-bound, so that these targets are 
incorporated in the public budget where they can be regularly monitored and 
evaluated (EUWI, 2007). The OECD methodology places its focus on the 
operational costs and the ability of the users to pay the operational costs directly 
associated with the service level desired (EUWI, 2007). OECD methodology does 
not focus on the project level but rather the strategic and program levels (EUWI, 
2007). The SMART framework is the foundation for the development of the 
quantitative tool FEASIBLE, which forecasts what a water project would cost 
taking into account the likelihood of available funds (EUWI, 2010).  
5.3 FEASIBLE 
Financing for Environmental, Affordable and Strategic Investments that 
Bring on Large-scale Expenditure Model (FEASIBLE) was designed in 1999 as a 
collaboration between the OECD and COWI, a consultant firm specializing in 
engineering, environmental science, and economics (OECD, 1999). FEASIBLE 
initially started out as an excel spreadsheet and has evolved into a computer-based 
tool that considers the expenditure needs (in terms of investment and operation 
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and management expenditure needs) to meet specific and time bound targets of 
financing by grants, loans, user charges, and public subsidies. The expenditures can 
be applied to water supply, wastewater, and sanitation or waste sector projects 
(Fonseca, Dube and Verhoeven, 2011).  
 
FEASIBLE uses generic cost functions to establish investment and 
operation with maintenance expenditure needs based on inputs from existing 
physical infrastructure and the future physical infrastructure desired to meet the 
intended targets (Fonseca, Dube and Verhoeven, 2011). Costs functions can be 
adapted with local relative prices or default values for the scenario along with 
infrastructure values for regions or municipalities. Debt terms and services can be 
specified to borrowing terms which can then be cross-examined with user charges 
to determine affordability. This comparison determines where financing gaps exist 
between the expenditures needs given by a set of goals with available financing 
(OECD, 2004).  
 
The FEASIBLE financial gap results imply (DANCEE and OECD, 2004): 
 
1. Future supply of finance assumptions from user charges, 
public budgets and donors are insufficient for the scope of 
the project; or 
 
2. The scope of the future service level is elaborate or beyond 
the limits of future supply or financing; or 
 
3. A combination of (1) and (2) 
 
 50 
 
The FEASIBLE model has four main components (DANCEE and OECD, 
2004): 
 
1. General Information: information pertaining to the 
geographic area, region, municipality, and groups of 
municipalities with the basic macro-economic data of the 
scenario. 
 
2. Expenditures: projected environmental expenditures that 
include operation and maintenance, reinvestments, 
renovations and new investments in infrastructure that are 
based on current situations and service level targets of users. 
 
3. Finance Supply: existing and future supply of finance from 
user charges, public budgets, loans, and grants. 
 
4. Financing gaps/results: aggregated results on financing gaps 
and selected technical parameters are available for 
assessments. 
 
Based on the inputs, FEASIBLE creates a baseline scenario to evaluate and 
establish strategic development. The structure of FEASIBLE is illustrated in 
Figure 5.3 and the methodology overview of FEASIBLE is presented in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.3. Structure of FEASIBLE (EUWI, 2010) 
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Figure 5.4. Methodology overview of FEASIBLE Source: OECD, 2007 
 
 
5.4 Proposed Model – Optimization of Water Financing (OWF) 
The above discussed models approach financing mechanisms in ways that 
costs are being calculated. The purpose of the herein proposed Optimization of 
Water Financing (OWF) model is to create flexible financing terms through a 
feedback loop system that uses the most current or real-time depiction of a life 
cycle analysis (LCA) of the water project. The financing terms will be linked to the 
LCA results through the on-going feedback loops within the model which can be 
continuously modified to mutually benefit the stakeholders. 
 
In order to meet the above objectives, the OWF uses the System Dynamics 
(SD) method for the LCA of the water project. Thus far the application of SD in 
financing of the water sector has only been considered within the last few years and 
only within the scope of research papers. Bianchi and Montemaggiore (Bianchi and 
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Montemaggiore, 2008) used SD for strategic design and planning for a project in a 
municipal water company. Their case study shows that SD can significantly 
improve the planning process, identification of causal relationships between policy 
and performance. It further helps to better communicate strategy with 
stakeholders, handling the demand profile and seasonality factors. In a recent paper 
by Rehan et al. (Rehan et al, 2011) the authors use a SD approach to develop a 
demonstration model for water and wastewater network management that is 
financially self-sustainable over the long-run. The authors find that existing 
infrastructure management systems and tool are not sustainable and that a SD 
approach is a viable method for modeling the management of water and 
wastewater networks. The strength of using SD lies in particular in the ability to 
model complex systems with many interconnections and feedback loops (Rehan et 
al, 2011). SD can resolve common shortcomings of models like unidirectional 
causality that for example is unable to distinguish delays between actions and their 
impact on performance (Akkermans and van Oorschot, 2005). SD has been found 
to be a well-grounded, flexible and realistic approach to deal with uncertainties in 
water resource management (WRM) and therefore provides a crucial tool in 
adaptive management thereof (Winz, Brierley, & Trowsdale, 2009). In the 
following the basics of SD will be reviewed and the methodology of OWF 
discussed. 
 
5.4.1 System Dynamics 
System Dynamics (SD) is a method used to describe the behavior of 
complex systems over time. It was developed in the 1950th by Jay W. Forrester at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Forrester, 2007) and finds wide ranging 
applications in the fields of management, engineering, and computer science.  
Systems dynamics can furthermore play a role in making strategic decisions (Gary, 
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Kunc, Morecroft & Rockart, 2008). SD uses chains of relationships that are 
constructed based on physical flows (cash, materials, etc.) and information flows 
(Wolsenholme, 1982). The foundation of SD is rooted in systems that are each 
linked through conditions of system variables, which are unknown variables from 
identified conditions of other system variables. This creates an environment of 
uncertainty that is adapted into our mathematical model to describe the random 
nature of the development of stakeholder interests.  
 
Both qualitative and quantitative analysis is used in our approach, as 
illustrated in Figures 5.5 and 5.6. Figure 5.5 shows the generalized SD approach 
adapted from E. F. Wolstenholme (1982 and 1983).    
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System Description: 
Qualitative Analysis 
Quantified Analysis Using Continuous Simulation 
Techniques 
Stage 1 Stage II Stage III 
1. Current Financial 
Models 
2. Using physical, 
cash, and 
information flows 
3. Examine water 
financing feedback 
loop structure 
1. Examine the 
behavior of all 
system variables 
over time. 
2. Examine the 
validity and 
sensitivity of the 
model to changes in: 
(i) Structure; 
(ii) Policies 
(iii) Delays and 
uncertainties 
Examine 
alternative 
structures and 
control policies 
base on: 
(i) Intuitive 
ideas; 
(ii) Control 
theory 
analogies; 
(iii) Control 
theory 
algorithms 
Optimize 
system 
parameters 
To provide: 
(i) A perspective on 
water financing or 
symptoms of the 
water financing 
market 
(ii) A qualitative 
analysis on which 
to base 
recommendations 
for water financing 
change 
 
Provide a quantified assessment of alternative ways of 
improving system performance 
Figure 5.5. Systems Dynamic Approach for Water Resource Financing – 
Optimization Framework (adapted from Systems Dynamic Methodology, 
Wolstenholme, 1983) 
 
 
When applied to water financing, the three stages of the quantitative 
analysis can be modeled as depicted in Figure 5.6.  
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 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
Water 
Financing  
Definition of: 
• Objectives 
• Variables 
 
Definition and application of 
relevant modeling techniques: 
• Mathematical models 
• Financing instruments 
• Expenditure models 
 
Definition and 
implementation of: 
• Performance 
measure 
• Feedback loops 
• Feedback control 
 
Figure 5.6. Stages of Systems Dynamic Methodology for Water Financing Sector 
(Adapted from Systems Dynamic Methodology, Wolstenholme, 1983) 
 
 
For the implementation of the framework, a mathematical optimization 
method called Optimal Control Theory (OCT) is used. The objective of OCT is to 
determine a control function that will cause a process to satisfy constraints and at 
the same time minimize (or maximize) a performance measure (Kirk, 1970). This 
can be achieved by usage of a closed-loop feedback control structure as 
schematically shown in Figure 5.7. The usage of a feedback structure allows for 
controlling complex and dynamic systems that change over time. In Figure 5.7 the 
“controller” and the “system” are connected such that they both influence each 
other. Through the “measurement” component the state of the system can be 
compared to the desired state. By feeding this information back into the loop, 
corrective actions can be taken to approach the desired state of the system. 
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Figure 5.7. Basic Feedback Control Theory (Texample.net, 2006) 
 
 
It is this basic feedback loop structure that is adapted in this thesis to 
create an optimal water financing framework. 
 
5.4.2 OWF Methodology 
The OWF feedback loop structure is depicted in Figure 5.8 and makes use of the 
following variables: 
   
1. r = reference, which is the ideal outcome of a water project 
2. u = variation of control variables 
3. y = performance parameter being measured 
4. e = error (reference – actual) 
 
 
 58 
 
 
Figure 5.8. OWF Feedback Control Theory 
 
 
In the schematic, the reference (r), defines the input parameters describing 
the ideal outcome of a water project, as determined by stakeholder interests. 
Through the input point (e), the parameters enter the controller which controls the 
variation of control variables (u) that regulate the water project. The measured 
output (y), describes the actual state of the system, which is fed into the sensor. 
The sensor compares the actual state of the system with the desired state and 
computes the error (e), which is then fed into the controller to change the control 
parameters to minimize the error. The loop is continuously repeated, allowing the 
system to approach the ideal outcome.  
 
The feedback control structure can be implemented using the method of 
Dynamic Programming (DP), which leads to a functional equation that can be 
solved by a computer (Kirk, 1970). DP is widely used in engineering to determine 
the control signals that will cause a process to satisfy the physical constraints and 
at the same time minimize or maximize the performance criterion (Kirk, 1970). 
Differential equations are used to find the optimum control function that 
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maximizes the performance. For the purpose of the OWF framework optimal 
control using ordinary differential equations (ODE) and stochastic differential 
equations (SDE) are considered.  In the following we will discuss the basic 
framework of the two approaches. The description of the ODEs is based on the 
“Optimal Control Theory” written by Kirk (Kirk, 1970), while we refer to the 
lecture by Evans from UC Berkley (Evans, 1983) for SDEs.  
 
Optimal control using ODE can be achieved using the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation which is a non-linear partial differential equation. The control 
function of the OWF can be described by the state equation (Kirk, 1970): 
 
 ̇( )   ( ( )  ( )  ) (Eq. 5.1) 
 
With x(t) being the state vector of the system and u(t) the control vector. 
The state equation is to be controlled to maximize or minimize the performance 
measure (Kirk, 1970): 
   ( (  )   )  ∫  ( ( )  ( )  )   
  
  
 (Eq. 5.2) 
 
where h and g are specified functions, t0 and tf are fixed, and  is a dummy 
variable of integration (Kirk, 1970). In order to determine the function that for 
example minimizes J, the following equation needs to be solved (Kirk, 1970): 
 
  ( ( )  )            {∫  ( ( )  ( )  )    ( (  )   )
  
 
} (Eq. 5.3) 
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After applying Bellman’s optimality principal, this equation yields the 
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, whose solution gives us the optimal 
feedback control (Kirk, 1970): 
 
    
 ( ( )  )   ( ( )   ( ( )   
   )   
   ) (Eq. 5.4) 
 
The solution of the HJB equation yields J*, which is the optimum value of 
our performance measure. In order to find the optimal solution, we will need to 
find the control law that minimizes the performance measure, J. In order to do so 
we must first specify a performance measure, which is a mathematical expression of 
all terms that need to be minimized. Using J and the Hamiltonian H, defined as 
(Kirk, 1970): 
 
 ( ( )  ( )   
   )   ( ( )  ( )  )     
  ( ( )  )[ ( ( )  ( )  )] (Eq. 5.5) 
 
In case of an unconstrained control, the necessary condition that the 
optimal control must satisfy is (Kirk, 1970): 
 
  
  
   
 
From this equation we can derive u*(t), the optimal control function. The 
control function can then be substituted in the HJB equation. Furthermore, the 
boundary value for the partial differential equation (PDE) can be found by setting 
t = tf. From Eq. 5.3, it is apparent that the boundary condition I (Kirk, 1970)s: 
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  ( (  )   )   ( (  )   ) (Eq. 5.6) 
 
One way to solve the HJB equation is to guess a form for the solution to see 
if it can be modified or adjusted to satisfy the differential equation and the 
boundary conditions. Once the solution is found then the optimal control law can 
be specified (Kirk, 1970). While this approach is viable for simple cases, one is 
generally unable to find a solution this easily. In general the HJB equation must be 
solved by numerical techniques. Such techniques that involve an approximation to 
the exact optimization will be employed in the OWF, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
The second method is the use of controlled SDEs. The following is based on 
the lecture notes of Evans (Evans, 2011). SDEs differ from ODEs in that they 
contain a “white noise” term that causes random fluctuations (Evans, 2011). 
Stochastic dynamic programming is of particular importance, as it provides 
reasonable solutions to account for uncertainties of water resource systems planning 
(Luo, 2007). A SDE can be written as (Evans, 2011) 
 
  ( )   ( ( )  ( ))       ( )         (Eq. 5.7) 
 
The expected payoff functional has the form (Evans, 2011) 
 
    [ ( )]   {∫  ( ( )  ( ))    ( ( ))
  
  
} . (Eq. 5.8) 
In contrast to the deterministic model discussed earlier, the stochastic 
functional contains an expectation value E that describes the random nature of P 
(Evans, 2011). 
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The value function can be defined as  (   )         [ ( )] 
 
Simply, we are obtaining the supremum (maximum) of P, our payoff 
function. In order to do so, the method of dynamic programming can be employed. 
The first step is to find a PDE that is satisfied by v, which is then used to design 
an optimal control u* (Evans, 1983).  
  
To find a solution we consider that u is any control function that is used for 
the time interval t    t+h and that the optimal control function is used 
thereafter. Then  
 
 (   )   {∫  ( ( )  ( ))    ( (   )    )
   
 
} (Eq. 5.9) 
 
In the case of optimal control the inequality becomes equality, if we take 
u()= u*(). To find the differential of Eq. 5.9, Itos chain rule (see for example 
Evan, 1983) can be used to yield: 
 
  ( ( )  )    ( ( )  )       (       ( ))  
  
 
      (Eq. 5.10) 
 
Plugging Eq. 5.10 into Eq. 5.9 one derives 
 
   {∫ ( ( ( )  ( ))     ( ( )  )      (       ( ))  
  
 
  )
   
 
   } 
(Eq. 5.11) 
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Dividing Eq. 5.11 by h and letting h approach 0 (h  0) one obtains the 
stochastic HJB equation: 
 
      {        
  
 
    }    (Eq. 5.12) 
 
Hence, the value function v(x,t) has been shown to solve the HJB PDE. 
 
The solution of the stochastic HJB equation yields v(x,t), the optimum 
value of the payoff functional P. The goal is to find the control law that maximizes 
the performance measure, P. In case of an unconstrained control, the necessary 
condition that the optimal control must satisfy is: 
 
  
  
 
 ( ( ( )  ( ))    
  
     ( 
( )  ( )))
  
    
 
(Eq. 5.13) 
 
As discussed for the ODE, we can derive u*(t), the optimal control function. 
The control function can then be substituted in the HJB equation. Furthermore, 
the boundary value for the PDE can be found by setting t = tf. From Eq. 5.8, it is 
apparent that the boundary condition is (Evans, 2011): 
 
 (    )         [ ( )]   ( (  )) (Eq. 5.14) 
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In Chapter 6, the functionality of optimal feedback control will be 
demonstrated using a simplified model that is stochastic and controllable using a 
PID controller to achieve ideal optimal performance. For the optimum OWF 
model, the simplified model needs to be expanded using the OTC and dynamic 
programming. 
 
In either case, the inputs and outputs of OWF need to use indicators to 
determine the parameters to measure. OWF adapts indicators from the 
International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET) 
Toolkit. A detailed description of each indicator is attached as Appendix B. The 
following is a list of indicators given by IBNET (2011): 
 
- Service coverage  
 
- Quality of Service 
 
- Water consumption and production  
 
- Billings and collections 
 
- Non revenue water  
 
- Financial Performance 
 
- Metering practices  
 
- Assets 
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- Pipe network performance  
 
- Affordability of services 
 
- Costs and Staffing 
  
- Process indicators 
 
These indicators should be initiated and compiled by the borrower or end-
user first with the appropriate stakeholders who then facilitate a discussion to 
negotiate the financing terms with the lender which also may occur with the 
collaboration of an NGO or charitable organization. The results from the 
inputs/outputs of the indicators then can create a simulated cash flow for the 
borrower and lender that are optimized for efficient flexible financing terms with 
feedback loops. Examples of this information feedback between stakeholders is 
illustrated in Figure 5.9 
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Figure 5.9. Information Feedback between Stakeholders (Source: Cap-Net, GWP, 
& EUIW, 2008) 
 
 
The goals of financing OWF for the end-user stakeholders ultimately are to 
have water paying for water, and only water (Cap-Net, GWP, & EUIW, 2008). 
Other targets adapted from the EU Water Imitative (EUWI) with the Global 
Water Partnership and Cap-Net of the UN economic sustainability of water 
management framework includes: 
 
- Ensuring sufficient revenue to deliver services in the long term 
 
- Ensuring sufficient revenues supporting improved quality of services 
 
- Ensuring sufficient revenues extending service coverage, specifically 
to low-income consumers 
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- Ensuring better use of scarce water resource and management of 
wastewater disposal conserving the natural environment 
 
Additionally the training guide cited external and internal factors that 
should be monitored on an ongoing basis for sustainability of water resource 
management listed in Table 5.1 
 
 
External Factors Internal Factors 
 Government support 
 Autonomy 
 Understanding of external risks 
 Understanding of economic base 
 Financial and credit management 
 Management quality/capacity 
 Operational performance 
 Strategic planning and internal 
transformation 
 Human resources and utilization 
of private sector 
 Customer relations 
 
Table 5.1. Internal and external factors to support utility transformation 
(Source: Cap-Net, GWP, & EUIW, 2008) 
 
 
The importance of this analysis of this methodology, OWF, provides 
guidance in moving from “what is” to “what should be” in determining the 
objectives of the methodology (Wolstenholme, 1983). 
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Reference Input  Objective 
Which costs must be covered? Payment, cash  
Purchase of hardware and tools 
Running costs for project 
System expansion 
Financing repayment 
 
Which funds should be used? Community contributions 
User contributions 
Interest from community savings 
External funds (donors, NGOs, national 
governments, etc.) 
Which tariffs should be used? Flat tariffs irrespective of amount used 
Flat tariff per consumer where payments 
depend of the number of persons in the 
household; not amount used 
Tariff per unit of water drawn 
Low tariff for low-income households 
High tariff for high income households 
Low tariff for the first few units per person 
with higher tariff for subsequent units per 
person 
How to collect contributions? User contributions to establish a separate 
water project funded deposit account 
User fees through metered connections, 
payments at the water point or 
weekly/monthly payment to the treasurer 
Submitting proposals for external funding 
When is an appropriate time to collect 
contributions? 
Monthly 
At the beginning of the fiscal year 
As and when required 
After a crop or other productive activity 
What to do in a default scenario? Analyses causes of cash flow non-payments 
Restructure cash flow payments 
Improve services 
Determine if and when to cut losses  
Where funds should be deposited? Community account 
Dedicated account in a bank 
In objects that can serve as investment 
What should be taken into consideration to 
administer the funds? 
Receipts for accounting 
Financial control 
Authorization to draw money from the bank 
account 
Comments and recommendations of the 
users 
Who should administer the funds? Community committee 
Community accountant 
External accountant 
How to pay for staff for are responsible for 
operations and management 
In cash or in-kind 
After a task has been fulfilled 
On a monthly basis 
Every year, after a crop or other productive 
activity 
Figure 5.10. Elements of Financing Mechanisms in OWF (Adapted from Cap-Net, 
GWP, & EUIW, 2008) 
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CHAPTER 6 
THEORETICAL CASE MODEL AND MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
 
In this chapter the inputs and outputs of the OWF model are discussed 
based on a case model. Furthermore, the feasibility of the OWF model discussed in 
Chapter 5 is demonstrated using a simplified model. In particular, the ability of the 
model to react to the random fluctuation of inputs and the use of feedback control 
to optimize the performance, as defined by the stakeholders, is shown. Furthermore 
we demonstrate how the OWF model could mitigate potential shortfalls and 
challenges of the project to make it more financially sustainable. 
 
 
6.1 Water Project Selection 
For the foundation of the theoretical case model a water project carried out 
by Enersol, a non-profit organization working with water pumps powered by 
renewal energy sources in the Dominican Republic since 1993 was used. Enersol 
works with the Associate for the Development of Solar Energy (ADESOL) to 
develop projects in rural communities. 
 
Using the case study based on Enersol’s model for renewable energy for 
rural community water supply, the proposed water project suggests that a solar 
powered water pumping system with water treatment and water holding tank 
system should be used (Graham and Johnson, 2000). This decision was also derived 
by considering site selection parameters based on the technical note by Charey et 
al (Chaurey, et al, 1993). Solar furthermore was chosen over gas and wind as it is 
economically and logistically more favorable, as corroborated by a case study by 
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Cloutier (Cloutier, 2011). Solar pump systems have been proven to be reliable, 
cost-efficient, and to deliver high performance (Meah, 2006). Solar systems have a 
higher upfront cost that can be handled financially by designing parameters of a 
cash flow that take advantage of user’s willingness to pay (Singh, et al, 1993).  
 
For water projects using renewal energy sources the size and feasibility of a 
system design is driven by 3 parameters (Graham and Johnson, 2000): 
 
1. The daily water demand 
2. The vertical distance water is pumped 
3. The availability of renewable energy resources 
 
A sample case is taken from Enersol and ADESOL’s work, where the feasibility 
of the above parameters is given. The case is examined and its inputs are adapted 
into the OWF model framework. The case community will be called Esperanza for 
our sample case. 
 
6.2 Esperanza Profile 
Esperanza’s initial population is 237. The local access to water is critical 
because of the surrounding arid areas and poor surface water that require on 
average two and half hours or more to obtain access to drinking water (Source: 
Graham and Johnson, 2000). Table 6.1 lists the assumed systems parameters of the 
desired water project: 
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Parameter Assumption 
Daily water demand Approximately 30 liters per person per day. Water for 
household uses only. 
Insolation (energy source) 5 kWh per m2 per day 
Water storage capacity 3 days minimum 
Distribution system Metered-pay 
Population growth 2% annually 
Table 6.1. Design parameters of Esperanza project (adapted from Graham and 
Johnson, 2000) 
 
 
The base case model stipulated ADESOL would maintain ownership of the 
water pumping equipment and the power source (solar modules) with the use of 
tariffs to manage the costs of the system. 
 
Using the general approach of ADESOL’s project development for 
implementation, the following steps were taken (Source: Graham and Johnson, 
2000): 
 
1. Community visits to evaluate the feasibility of project 
2. Perform studies as necessary to determine project feasibility 
3. Meetings with community to discuss conditions of a feasible project 
4. Wait for community to make a decision 
5. Hold workshops to assist community with development of a water 
board 
6. Develop water well 
7. Develop civil works 
8. Install photovoltaic (PV) system with local solar support 
9. Inaugurate water system 
10. Post-installation technical assistance 
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The community’s responsibilities included: 
 
1. Daily system operation 
2. Maintenance of civil works 
3. Collection of monthly payments 
i. Insurance policy  
ii. Financed payments  
 
6.3 Esperanza System Challenges and Design 
The Esperanza project faces several challenges pertaining to site selection, 
appropriate technology, water quality standards, community participation, and 
adequate financing. By utilizing the water dialogue space between stakeholders for 
the process of valuing water and governance from Chapter 4, these challenges can 
be discussed and managed among the stakeholders for sustainable development. 
Because communities are ever changing and dynamic, financial flexibility must be 
inherent in both the physical aspects of the project, as well as the financing model 
applied. In simulating the mapping process of stakeholders detailed in Chapter 3, 
and using Enersol’s Esperanza project (Source: Graham and Johnson, 2000) as the 
case study, the following challenges to  determine the assumptions and decisions of 
our base case were established: 
 
1. Site selection: the community was able to properly identify a 
location for the project with sufficient infrastructure to support the 
system. Site location determined adequate well resources to avoid 
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previous issues of wells running dry and additional costs in 
generating new wells for failed wells. 
2. Appropriate technology: the selection of a PV system requires less 
technical knowledge and maintenance or repairs but should account 
for reputation of technology. Reliability of manufacture product 
information is needed for reasonable maintenance and repairs of 
equipment and materials. 
3. Costs of systems: the majority of the system, over the course of its 
lifetime, is up-front. Incremental costs usually account for 15-25% 
of the total life cycle costs. Cost recovery and planning for long-
term care of the system is an integral part of designing a feasible 
water system. 
4. Technical designs: typical PV systems tend to require less technical 
knowledge. However, technical materials are generally difficult to 
find locally when problems arise with the PV systems that either 
requires a minor repair that a local technician can handle or a 
system component replacement. A new set of skills were needed for 
the installation pumps, controllers and module systems. The 
construction of civil works required further skills as well as training. 
5. System maintenance: PV systems usually involve less maintenance 
and repairs compared to traditional groundwater well pump 
designs. Maintaining adequate supply of parts and materials is 
needed to account for balancing the annual costs. 
6. Timescales: timing of project review, design and implementation 
was an important factor in selecting the ideal water project. The 
water system was chosen to account for development of a budget 
plan for realistic time frames. The most difficult areas were 
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centered on the required time necessary to implement the system, 
community participation and development of payment of the 
financing model. 
7. Price of water service: In determining the ideal method of billing 
for users, a meter-payment option was selected to manage water 
use by the residents for controlling waste and minimizing water 
losses. By selecting this method of billing the willingness to pay 
(WTP) can ideally meet the water demand to reach the true costs 
of the water system. The WTP depends on the user’s monthly 
household income and is a critical factor in meeting the financial 
obligations of the debt service.  
8. Water quality: past water quality results have not met household 
consumption standards. Due to the poor quality users choose not to 
consume enough water to support the investment of the project 
which significantly lowered the WTP. Water quality testing and 
monitoring is included in the project design to meet user standards 
in the community. 
 
6.4 Esperanza Project Financing 
Understanding the system cost over time (life cycle costs) from the onset is 
one the major challenges facing the rural community due to the lack of experience 
with financing and technology. Initial costs depend on how the cash outlay is 
structured using subsidized or non-subsidized systems. Esperanza’s subsidies ranged 
from various donated time from non-profit groups or vendors, to discounted 
materials and equipment yielding a total project cost for the financing loan of 
$15,068USD. By distinguishing the costs associated for the PV water pumping 
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system into four areas (1) the initial capital cost or cash outlay, (2) life cycle cost 
(LCC), (3) cost on a per beneficiary basis, and (4) cost per volume (m3), these can 
be used as parameters to determine project feasibility and to tailor specific terms 
to manage expectations and overall financial performance (Graham and Johnson, 
2000). 
 
An LCC model was developed to include the initial, operating, and 
replacement costs of the PV water systems over the expected project life. Although 
solar modules are expected to work for 20-30 years, a ten year life cycle was used 
due to the multitude of variable factors that can affect a system’s appropriateness 
for a specific community (Graham and Johnson, 2000). 
 
The LCC analysis also assumed these additional costs in the Esperanza base 
case: 
 
 A contract is given to a local solar company to maintain the 
system. 
 An insurance policy provided by the NGO covers the 
pump/controller. 
 A community member is paid to perform civil works repairs. 
 The pump and the controller are replaced after 7 years. 
 ADESOL charges an annual fee for on-going technical assistance 
and administration. 
 
The financial parameters used in the LCC are listed in Table 6.2.: 
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Return of equity 30% 
Percentage borrowed 100% 
Commercial interest rate 20% 
Inflation rate 12% 
Year of analysis 20 
Table 6.2. Financial parameters of the Life Cycle Cost (Source: Graham and 
Johnson, 2000) 
 
 
The initial cost of the equipment, system and project were calculated over 
the twenty year life cycle. The LCC analysis is highly sensitive to the inputs so the 
numbers are provided as rough estimates (Graham and Johnson, 2000). 
 
The quality of the long-term system care of a system is only a fraction of 
the initial investment made. It is important to design models for rural water supply 
that have components for cost recovery and plan for long-term care of the system 
given that each one is interdependent of each other. One solution is to utilize 
insurance contracts to hedge against variable costs and market risks. Enersol has 
an insurance policy for borrowers that allow the burden of annual costs to be 
hedged with an agreed flat fee and any costs above that amount are born by the 
insurer. Should the project not exceed the amount of the fees paid to the insurer, it 
is not refunded to the borrower. A flexible financing model could be adapted to 
monitor and manage variable costs and market risks by closely analyzing the cash 
flows income to debt. 
 
Esperanza pays a monthly insurance fee for a policy on the water pumping 
system. If the system fails ADESOL is responsible for the repair or replacement 
costs. This fee was included with the monthly payment of annual service fee made 
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to ADESOL. ADESOL requires that communities make payments in their offices 
or they will cutoff water supply when payments are not made on time (Source: 
Graham and Johnson, 2000).  
 
Esperanza’s monthly payments over a 5 year period are expected to cover 
an estimated 30-50% of the initial capital investment in the PV water pumping 
equipment (Source: Graham and Johnson, 2000). The willingness to pay is 
impacted by the water quality delivered by the PV system. If the water is not 
considered suitable for drinking or cooking, the willingness to pay will decrease 
reducing the likelihood of the user fees to cover the initial capital investment. 
Analysis from studies conducted on rural water supply systems indicate that over 
the long term, with additional households connected to the water systems there 
will be a demand and willingness to pay for the improved service (Singh, et al, 
1993). Additional investments will be needed in filters and technology to bring the 
water quality to acceptable standards which in turn will drive up the costs of the 
overall system. These additional investments can also negatively impact the 
willingness to pay and must be relayed to the end-user by in proportion to the 
average household income. 
 
6.5 Research Design 
The objective of the case model is to determine whether the proposed 
theoretical mathematical framework can facilitate sustainable financing strategies 
to optimize usage of funds. The studied parameters and indicators used for the 
cash flow analysis are detailed in Appendix E. A total of three cash flows were 
compiled for the cash flow analysis. Cash flow A uses the Esperanza base case 
model previously discussed in this chapter. Cash flow B simulates the Esperanza 
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base case but assumes that the village pays for the real arising costs rather than 
using an insurance payment. Using the assumption of 15-25% maintenance cost 
over the life time of the project and the theoretical mathematical model we 
demonstrate that the overall project costs are significantly lower in the OWF 
model.  Cash flow C presents the OWF framework to replicate a cash flow that 
uses a feedback loop to manage financial disturbances in order to optimize usage of 
funds for a desired rate of return and warrant sustainability of the Esperanza water 
project. Cash flow C’s structure is described in greater detail in the next section.  
 
6.6 Cash Flow C: OWF Case Model 
The OWF model for Esperanza’s Case C used the underlying assumptions 
and the true project data (e.g. the amount of water produced) of the base case 
model, A, to incorporate a feedback loop system using a current or real-time 
depiction of the LCA of the case. The financing terms were linked to the true 
project cost and results of the cash income through on-going feedback loops within 
the model which are continuously modified to meet the expectation of the ideal 
water project among the stakeholders. 
 
The System Dynamics (SD) process of linking conditions of system 
variables, which are unknown from identified conditions of other system variables, 
is adapted mathematically to describe the random nature of stakeholder interests. 
SD is implemented using a performance measure, feedback loops and feedback 
control. 
 
The signals of the control system of a feedback loop structure as shown in 
Figure 5.8, for OWF’s case model are defined as: 
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r = setpoint (reference: the ideal outcome of the water project) 
u = revenue offset factor (variation: control variable) 
y = operational cash flow (performance parameter being measured) 
e = error (setpoint – operational cash flow) 
 
The feedback control structure was first implemented by using a rule-based 
system design methodology where the rules are treated as the decision variables 
(Liu, Zabinsky & Kohn, 2010). The output is continually used in the forecasting of 
the control system to correct the desired behavior (Liu, Zabinsky & Kohn, 2011). 
The operation rules are a subset of rules determined by the managers of the system 
to directly model operations using their expertise (Liu, Zabinsky & Kohn, 2010). 
By having OWF behave using rule-based logic for the revenue offset factor, u, the 
system can appropriately respond to the ideal water financing for the stakeholders.  
 
The rule-based system design was then improved by replacing it with a 
proportional-integral-derivative (PID) controller that is a very effective method to 
keeping the process variable closely within a setpoint (VanDoren, 2003). PID 
controllers are generally used to control systems with linear response and can be 
highly unstable for non-linear systems, like the herein discussed case. The process 
variables were manually adjusted to yield the best control behavior for the 
nonlinear time invariant water project. The cash flow uses a PID controller to 
adjust the revenue offset factor using the following mathematical formula: 
 
                                                               
                 (                            ) 
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The gain parameters are used to adjust the behavior of the PID controller 
to fluctuation of the operational cash flow (OC) of the system. The errors relate to 
the difference of the OC and the desired setpoint of the system. The later can be 
defined by the stakeholders to achieve a particular project revenue goal.  In our 
case, the OC is the negative of the sum of the differences of the monthly actual 
cost-assumed cost and the monthly actual cost-project income. The monthly 
amount billed (MAB) is rule based to inhibit overshooting of the PID control loop 
in the event of large random cost spikes. The MAB therefore first compares the 
amount to be charged to the maximum amount for which the WTP is non-zero. If 
the amount is larger than the WTP, only the maximum amount is charged and the 
remaining cost is rolled over to the next billing cycle. This is only the case when 
the project cost drastically increases, as in the case of a pump failure. If the 
amount is within a range of non-zero WTP, the PID controller provides a factor by 
which the MAB is multiplied. Using the feedback control loop describes above, the 
PID controller adjust the MAB such that the operational cash flow is continuously 
adjusted to approach the desired setpoint. Cash flow risk distribution commonly is 
controlled by the timing of payments which substantiates the use of the controller 
to modify the billing costs for the project (Garden and Creese, 2000). 
    
By using the revenue offset factor to adjust the amount billed and hence the 
cash income in the next billing cycle, the revenue from the user’s fees can facilitate 
in the cost recovery of the project and manage the overall risk for stakeholders. As 
described above the control loops considers the optimum price point the users are 
willing to pay, adjusting the unfunded liability balance using forward billing until 
that amount is no longer a liability. Any disturbances encountered in the cash flow 
such as poor water quality and replacement costs of technology and material are 
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examples of how this is factored into the billing arrangement through the revenue 
offset factor.  
  
The indicators used in PID program are: 
1. Actual costs less the assumed max costs 
2. Actual costs less the actual income 
3. Operational cash flow measure 
 
6.7 Cash Flow Analysis 
Hypothesis: the existing cash flow analysis is adequate to determine 
feasibility and financial sustainability of water projects. 
 
Null hypothesis: proposed mathematical model using optimal feedback 
control theory to maximize the performance of a water project. 
 
In considering the structure of the hypothesis and the cash flow analysis 
used for the data, the three cases were used to determine the significance of the 
proposed OWF framework. The sample size consisted of the initial year to start up 
the project and 19 year cash flow broken into the monthly payments for a 20 year 
project (228 months). Because cash flow risk occurs when the project is 
implemented, a period to period approach is best in cash flow analysis (Garden and 
Creese, 2000). However, the first year was not factored into the financial pro forma 
arranged between the borrower and lender it was not included in our cash flow 
analysis. 
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All of the data and information needed for calculating the projected cash 
flows were taken from the base case, Esperanza. Considering the structure of the 
cash flow hypothesis and collected data, a one-way ANOVA, f-test was applied for 
data analysis. 
  
6.8 Results and Discussion 
Results of 100 runs of the cash flows of Case A, B, and C were analyzed 
using the ANOVA analysis included in the Microsoft Excel Analysis ToolPak. This 
analysis provides a variety of statistical results for data analysis and hypothesis 
testing.  
 
In addition, the operational cash flow, along with its two constituents the 
differences of actual cost – assumed cost (Indicator 1) and actual cost – income 
(Indicator 2), is plotted for comparison. 
 
The results for Case A and Case B are plotted in Figure 6.1 and listed in 
Table 6.3. As case A relates to the initial water project, the variation seen all cash 
flows is rather low. Indicator 1 shows a steady decline due to a 7% discount rate, 
which in turn leads to a slow increase of the operational cash flow over the course 
of the project. The total project cost for case A is $ 22,016.58, which corresponds 
to about 1% revenue. 
 
Case B is based on the assumptions used in Case A, but includes random 
monthly costs that correspond to the 15-25% assumed for maintenance cost over 
the life cycle. A PID controller with setpoint of 50 is used to flexibly adjust the 
operational efficiency. The cash flows in Case B show an overshooting of the 
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control loops in the beginning months. This is due to the non-linearity of the 
system and could be mitigated by using different control gain parameters at the 
beginning of the project. Since the goal of this section is to show the general 
functionality of a system using a control loop, this error will not be neglected 
hereafter. Despite the randomness in the cost, the cost factors in the right panel of 
Figure 6.1 are fairly constant with low overall noise, considering that the deviations 
are stemming for a total of 100 runs. The setpoint in Case B was set to yield a 
slightly higher return rate (2%) as compared to Case A. The total cost for Case B 
was calculated to $16,261.38 which is significantly less than for Case A, 
$22,0618.58. The comparison shows that a water project with real-life cost factors 
that are random can be successfully run when using a control loop approach, 
especially due to the possibility of flexible adjustments of finance terms, as will be 
demonstrated in Case C. The Case C proof aims to maximize the results of optimal 
water quality, WTP, water demand, reducing overall costs, and the potential of the 
ideal water project. These results help achieve the notion of “water pays for water 
and only water” (Cap-Net, 2008).   
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Figure 6.1. Cash flows of base case, Case A (left) and Case B(right) 
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Table 6.3. Summary of Anova Analysis of Case A 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance 
Actual/assumed cost 22800 18147.2 0.80 0.009 
water prod/water demand 22800 33184.8 1.46 0.037 
water cost/moving average 22800 22549.3 0.99 0.001 
cash income/debt service 22800 22797.7 1.00 0.001 
H2O operating costs/pop served 22800 2562.1 0.11 0.003 
Actual-assumed cost 22800 -571153.1 -25.05 141.647 
actual cost - income 22800 403.1 0.02 7.316 
Operational cash flow 22800 570750.0 25.03 150.922 
 
ANOVA       
Source of 
Variation 
SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 28653554.63 8.00 3581694.33 107473.66 0.00 1.94 
Within Groups 6838247.29 205191.00 33.33    
       
Total 35491801.93 205199.00         
 
Table 6.4. Summary of Anova Analysis of Case B 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance 
Actual/assumed cost 22800 13564.2 0.59 0.002 
water prod/water demand 22800 33191.9 1.46 0.037 
water cost/moving average 22800 22534.3 0.99 0.001 
cash income/debt service 22800 22629.1 0.99 0.003 
H2O operating costs/pop. served 22800 440.0 0.02 0.000 
Actual-assumed cost 22800 -1133738.3 -49.73 30.895 
actual cost - income 22800 13196.4 0.58 22.090 
Operational cash flow 22800 1120541.9 49.15 62.441 
 
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 111513220 8 13939153 1086458 0 1.938459 
Within Groups 2632581.26 205191 12.82991    
       
Total 114145802 205199         
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In Case C additional disturbances are introduced that would under normal 
circumstances impose tremendous challenges for a water project if not stall it. The 
disturbances enter the system as higher random costs at random intervals costs 
relating to investments necessary to maintain water quality. The latter costs are 
modeled such the probability of them occurring is higher after specific time periods. 
This can be clearly seen by the areas of high fluctuations in the cash flows depicted 
in Figure 6.3. Despite the severe impact of the disturbances, the control loop is 
able to balance the operational cash flow by taking into account the WTP and by 
spreading the total cost over several billing cycles. The overall project cost of 
$22,242.53 is comparable to the Case A, $22,016.58, while a return of 13% was 
achieved.  
 
 
Table 6.5. Summary of Anova Analysis of Case C 
Groups Count Sum Average Variance 
Actual/assumed cost 22800 21405.5 0.94 0.412 
water prod/water demand 22800 33219.1 1.46 0.038 
water cost/moving average 22800 22549.9 0.99 0.001 
cash income/debt service 22800 21650.6 0.95 0.211 
H2O operating costs/pop. served 22800 2625.8 0.12 0.065 
Actual-assumed cost 22800 -
171186.6 
-7.51 6208.830 
actual cost - income 22800 115949.0 5.09 5227.751 
Operational cash flow 22800 55237.6 2.42 13243.603 
 
ANOVA       
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 2067046.65 8 258380.8 94.21962305 3.7E-157 1.938459 
Within Groups 562700416 205191 2742.325    
       
Total 564767463 205199         
 
 
 87 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Cash flows of Case C 
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The results show that control loops are a means for flexible financing of water 
projects, which can significantly improve the performance of such a system and the 
sustainability of the project overall. 
 
6.9 Future Work of Mathematical Model 
To demonstrate the functionality and output of the OWF model using 
optimal control, a stochastic version of the logistic model (also called Verhulst-
Pearl model) was programmed in the programming language Matlab. The results of 
this preliminary model are only hypothetical and meant as a proof of concept 
rather than relating to the earlier discussed Cases A-C. Future work will focus on 
this model.  The Verhulst-Pearl model describes the growth of population under 
the influence of limiting factors like resources. Therefore, it is similar to a water 
financing project whose objective is to maximize the performance under the 
influence of limiting factors. The basic logistic model is expanded to react to the 
random fluctuation of inputs. Furthermore feedback control is introduced to 
optimize the performance. 
 
The logistic model was established by Verhulst to model population growth 
and can be written in form of a differential equation: 
 
  
  
    (  
 
 
)     
   
 
 (Eq. 6.1) 
 
With M as the maximum size of the population and  as a parameter; the 
term y describes the growth, while the second term y2M-1 limits the growth due 
to constraints like lack of resources. 
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The random nature of the input variables can be introduced by adding the 
stochastic term  dW(t) which describes the random nature and leads to: 
 
  
  
    (  
 
 
)        (Eq. 6.2) 
 
Furthermore, in order to maximize the payoff function feedback control is 
introduced by the control term u(t): 
 
  
  
    (  
 
 
)         ( ) (Eq. 6.3) 
 
In the uncontrolled version (Eq. 6.2) the model approaches a long-term 
mean value, while the value of the performance function can be influenced in the 
controlled model (Eq. 6.3). The latter gives us a model that flexibly adjusts 
parameters using a feedback control term to maximize expectations between 
stakeholders. Over time, OWF will approach the desired outcome of stakeholders 
where it is mutually beneficial. The idea of OWF is to show that the action of 
control will change how the system progresses and the control design needs to come 
up with the best strategy. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the solution of stochastic differential equations 
usually requires numerical techniques that approximate the solution. The model 
uses the Euler-Maruyama (EM) method to solve the SDE. 
 
The EM approximation to the true solution is the Markov chain y defined as 
follows (Kloeden and Platen, 1992):  
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 partition the interval [0, T] into N equal subintervals of width δ > 0: 
                        
 
 
 
 set Y0 = x0; 
 recursively define Yn for 1 ≤ n ≤ N  by          (    )     √   
    , where              
The above mathematical model was programmed in Matlab code. In the 
following examples of various runs are discussed. 
 
Figure 6.3 shows the uncontrolled variation of a stochastic function with time. 
To show the effects of the parameters  and  on the dynamics of the model,  
was increased from top to bottom. It is clearly visible that the system approaches 
the steady state faster at higher values of . The value of  was varied between 0.1 
on the left and 0.5 on the right side. The parameter  can be used to describe the 
magnitude of the changes that are to be modeled (compare noise level in Figure 
6.3).  
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Figure 6.3. Result of an uncontrolled stochastical function with increasing value of 
 from top to bottom for  = 0.1 on the left and 0.5 on the right.  
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The comparison between the left and right side of Figure 6.3 shows that a 
larger value of   leads to a larger response of the overall system behavior. Hence, 
this parameter can be used to define the magnitude of various inputs on the overall 
system.  
 
In Figure 6.4 an example of a control feedback loop is presented for the case 
of a well-defined change (left) and multiple random changes (right). As described 
in the previous chapters, the idea of the model is to react flexible to changes of the 
input variables. On the left panel a defined change was introduced at a specific 
point in time. The result shows how the system adapts to the new condition. On 
the right hand side the amount of change was varied randomly (as reflected in the 
varying height of the steps in the output function).  
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Figure 6.4. Results of a controlled stochastic model with defined change of input   
(left) and random change of input (right).  
 
 
In order to apply this model to the theoretical model case, specific functions 
representing each input will need to be defined. The outcome of such a refined 
model will yield a financing model that can flexibly react to any changes in the 
input functions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) established the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to address the issue of sustainable access 
to safe drinking water and basic sanitation provisions of water by 2015. The UNDP 
estimates that currently just fewer than 900 million people lack access to safe 
water, where 8 out of 10 of those persons are living in rural areas along with just 
over 2.7 billion people lack access to basic sanitation (UNDP, 2011).  
 
Water infrastructure traditionally is financed by three types of sources: 
water users through a billing arrangement, tax payers and donors. Official 
development assistance (ODA) has been the key source for developing countries in 
leverage financial flows. The discussion of financing water policies and water 
regimes is highly debated amongst all give that the challenges of financial and 
technical assistance will continue to be at the forefront of the water sector debate. 
In considering these challenges due to the uncertainty in sector, water financing 
should be more inclusive of stakeholders expectations, such as the borrower, in 
determining the cash flow of monies distributed and invested in projects for their 
benefit “Involving the end user in project planning and implementation is essential 
to establishing community ownership and commitment to funding long-term 
maintenance which is an essential element of sustainable projects” (WASRAG, 
2008, p.24). 
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The main idea presented in this thesis was to provide a framework for a 
mathematical model for sustainable financing mechanisms of water projects funded 
by groups like non-governmental agencies (NGOs), philanthropic donors, and 
investors. The objective of the model is to benefit rural and underdeveloped 
communities to focus on borrower-lending financing strategies to optimize the 
usage of funds. 
 
The financial markets rely on investment science whereby applying scientific 
tools to investments in qualitative analysis, such as the character of those involved, 
and quantitative analysis which uses mathematics, finance, statistics, and computer 
science modeling. With the increase of investment science in the financial markets, 
they have by and large overlooked the importance of effective control mechanisms 
that fundamental to dynamic systems dependent on feedback loops to stabilize 
expected market changes (McMahon, 2011). It can be said that borrowers do not 
always make sensible or logical decisions as studied in behavioral economics 
arguing the conventional wisdom views of borrowers acting rationally and acting 
out in their benefit (Shicks and Rosenberg, 2011). We are all viewing the cash flow 
investment from our own individual perspective which is not necessarily aligned 
with all of the stakeholders. 
 
Cash flow analyses are metrics that have circular references like feedback 
loops that will always be unstable regardless of market stability or declines. This 
amplification of the feedback loop occurs over periods of time that can either be 
days, weeks, months, quarters, or years resulting in disconnects between borrowers 
and lenders of financial models. As observed by McMahon of the scientific concepts 
failed to be integrated in finance and economics, “we have incorporated the 
mathematical concept of equilibrium in our metrics, but we neglected to realize the 
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importance of other scientific phenomena, such as momentum, amplification, 
feedback loops, control theory, and the uncertainty principle. We have relied on 
our metric outputs as if efficient markets do not need stabilizers and behavioral 
finance phenomena are inconsequential and strategic opportunities for wise 
investors. Economic and financial models assume investors are rational and will 
pursue utility maximization, but behavioral factor often alter expected outcomes, 
sometimes to a severe degree” (p. 54).  
 
7.1 Results 
 With the theoretical mathematical model given with our initial results 
reaffirms the need to integrate control mechanism in dynamic systems dependent 
on feedback loops, to manage the fluctuating markets between borrowers and 
lenders. Applying investment science to water financing is a logical means of 
providing guidance of how things are in the present, to the potential possibility of 
how things should be within the dialogue of stakeholders. Ultimately, the 
framework gives what people want with water; “water pays for water and only 
water” (Cap-Net, 2008).  
 
7.3 Future Work 
The framework presented in thesis focuses on a development for sustainable 
water financing mathematical model for borrowers and lenders. The theoretical 
framework aids in the discussion of how can financing can really become innovative 
financing through a stochastic dynamic programming (SDP). SDP is an 
optimization approach taking into account the uncertainties of the system dynamic 
model of water financing. In the future we hope to expand this theoretical 
framework to include water projects financed using this mathematical model and 
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systems dynamic approach of qualitative and quantitative properties to further the 
movement of innovative financing between borrowers and lenders. Additionally, we 
hope to apply the results of the framework to other investment sectors of 
borrowing and lending. 
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APPENDIX A: IBNET INDICATORS 
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IBNET Indicator Definitions 
 
SERVICE INDICATOR UNIT DEFINITION 
1.1 Water Coverage % Population with access to water 
services (either with direct service 
connection or within reach of a 
public water point) as a percentage 
of the /total population under 
utility’s nominal responsibility 
1.2 Water Coverage – 
Household Connections 
% Sub-set of 1.1 
1.3 Water Coverage – 
Public Water Points 
% Sub-set of 1.1 
2.1  Sewerage Coverage % Population with sewerage services 
(direct service connection)as a 
percentage of the total population 
under utility’s notional responsibility 
Notes 
Coverage is a key development indicator.  All coverage indicators are impacted 
by whether the data on population and household size is up to date and accurate. 
The need to estimate the population served by public water points and/or the 
number of households per connection may affect the confidence that can be 
placed in the water coverage measure.  
Utilities are encouraged to provide a description what implicit assumptions are 
underlying their water and sewerage coverage estimates, including the number of 
people using public water points and household connections. 
WATER CONSUMPTION 
AND PRODUCTION 
INDICATOR 
UNIT DEFINITION 
3.1 Water Production 
3.2  Water Production 
litres/person/ 
day 
m3/conn 
/month 
 
Total annual water supplied 
to the distribution system 
(including purchased water, 
if any) expressed by  
 population served 
per day and  
 connection per 
month. 
4.1  Total Water Consumption 
4.2   Total Water Consumption 
litres/person/ 
day 
m3/conn 
/month 
Total annual water sold 
expressed by population 
served by 
 Population served 
per day 
 connection per 
month 
Water consumption split by 
customer type: 
 
4.3  Residential Consumption 
4.4  Industrial / commercial   
Consumption 
 
 
% 
 
 
Shows the split of total 
water consumption into four 
customer type categories 
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4.5  Consumption by 
Institutions & others 
4.6  Bulk treated supply 
Residential consumption: 
 
4.7 Residential Consumption 
4.8 Residential Consumption – 
connections to mains supply 
4.9 Residential consumption -  
public water points  
 
litres/person/ 
day 
 
Shows the average water 
consumption per person per 
day by customer category 
Notes 
The preferred water consumption indicator is expressed in terms of 
litres/person/day. However there are data issues with the use of this indicator, 
namely 
 lack of accurate total consumption data (especially when metering is not 
universal) 
 lack of up-to-date census data, or other relevant survey data, to determine (i) 
household size; (ii) sharing of connections between households; and (iii) 
number of households using public water points 
Inter utility comparisons will be more difficult, however, given the different mix 
of household sizes and dwellings served by one connection. This is especially the 
case between utilities in different countries, but it is not necessarily the case that 
household size, and dwellings per connection, or use of public water points are 
more similar within a country.   
The accuracy of service populations may need improvement, but will not be 
directly available from utilities unless the utilities undertake analysis to 
understand their consumer profiles.   
NON-REVENUE 
INDICATOR 
UNIT DEFINITION 
6.1 Non-Revenue Water 
 
 
6.2  Non-Revenue Water 
 
6.3 Non-Revenue Water 
% 
 
 
m3/km/day 
 
m3/conn/da
y 
Difference between water supplied 
and water sold (i.e. volume of water 
“lost”) expressed as a percentage of 
net water supplied 
Volume of water “lost” per km of 
water distribution network per day  
Volume of water “lost” per water 
connection per day.  
Notes 
Non-revenue water represents water that has been produced and is “lost” before it 
reaches the customer (either through leaks, through theft, or through legal usage 
for which no payment is made). Part of this “lost” water can be retrieved by 
appropriate technical and managerial actions.  It can then be used to meet 
currently unsatisfied demand (and hence increase revenues to the utility), or to 
defer future capital expenditures to provide additional supply (and hence reduce 
costs to the utility). 
The IWA distinguish between non-revenue water (%) and unaccounted for water, 
with the latter not including legal usage that is not paid for.  The indicators are 
usually measured in m3/conn/day. The difference is usually small, and the 
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IBNET Toolkit therefore only uses non-revenue water as an indicator. 
There is a debate as to the most appropriate measure of non-revenue water.  A 
percentage approach can make utilities with high levels of consumption, or 
compact networks, look to be better performing than those with low levels of 
consumption or extensive networks.  To capture these different perspectives the 
reporting of three measures of non-revenue water has become the norm. 
METERING PRACTICES 
INDICATOR 
UNIT DEFINITION 
7.1 Metering level % Total number of connections with 
operating meter/ total number of 
connections, expressed in percentage 
8.1  % sold that is metered  % Volume of water sold that is 
metered/ Total volume of water 
sold, expressed in percentage 
Notes 
Metering of customers is considered good practice.  It allows customers the 
opportunity to influence their water bills, and provides utilities with tools and 
information to allow them to better manage their systems. 
The indicators provide two separate perspectives on the issue, both of which are 
relevant in their own right.  Taken together the indicators provide insights into 
the effectiveness of a metering installation strategy (the ratio of indicator (8)/(7) 
indicates the extent to which a utility is targeting large water users as the 
highest priority).  
PIPED NETWORK 
INDICATOR 
UNIT DEFINITION 
9.1 Pipe Breaks breaks/km/yr. Total number of pipe breaks per 
year expressed per km of the water 
distribution network 
10.1 Sewer System 
Blockages 
blockages/km/
yr. 
Total number of blockages per year 
expressed per km of sewers 
Notes 
The number of pipe breaks, relative to the scale of the system, is a measure of 
the ability of the pipe network to provide a service to customers. 
The rate of water pipe breaks can also be seen as a surrogate for the general state 
of the network, although it reflects operation and maintenance practices too. It 
must be recognized, however, that highly aggregated reporting can hide the fact 
that sections of the network may be perpetually failing, whilst much of the 
remainder is in reasonable condition. Break rates for different materials, 
diameters or time periods laid can show where breaks are concentrated. 
Sewer blockages are, likewise, a measure of the ability of the sewer network to 
provide a service to customers.  Blockages can reflect a number of issues 
including the effectiveness of routine operations and maintenance activities, the 
hydraulic performance of the network, and the general condition of the pipes. 
Bursts include failures on mains, service pipes where they are the Utility’s 
responsibility, or at joints or fittings that are found by visible signs of water, not 
through leak detection by Utility staff.  Sewer blockages include all blockages or 
collapses that occur in sewers or drains that are the Utility’s responsibility, 
whatever action is needed to clear them. 
COSTS AND STAFFING UNIT DEFINITION 
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INDICATOR 
11.1 Unit Operational Cost 
Water and Wastewater 
(W&WW) 
11.2 Unit Operational Cost 
Water and Wastewater 
US$/m3 sold 
 
US$/m3 
produced 
Total annual operational 
expenses1/Total annual volume sold. 
Total annual operational 
expenses1/Total annual water 
produced. 
11.3 Unit Operational Cost 
– Water only 
11.4 Operational Cost 
Split - % Water 
11.5 Operational Cost 
Split - % Wastewater 
11.6 Unit Operational Cost 
– Wastewater 
US$/m3 sold 
 
% 
 
% 
 
US$/WW 
pop served 
Annual water service operational 
expenses1/Total annual volume sold. 
 
Split of the total cost into water and 
wastewater 
 
Annual wastewater operational 
expenses1/ Population served 
12.2 Staff W&WW/’000 
water and wastewater 
connections 
 
12.1 Staff Water /’000 
Water connections 
12.2 Staff Wastewater/’000 
Wastewater connections 
#/’000 
W&WW 
conn 
#/’000 W 
conn 
#/’000 WW 
conn 
Total number of staff expressed as 
per thousand connections 
12.4 Staff W&WW/’000 
W&WW pop served 
 
12.3 Staff Water/’000 
Water pop served 
12.6 Staff Wastewater/’000 
Wastewater pop served 
#/’000 
W&WW pop 
served 
#/’000 W 
pop served 
#/’000 WW 
pop served 
Total number of staff expressed as 
per thousand people served 
12.7 Staff % Water 
12.8 Staff % Wastewater 
%  
13.1 Labor Costs vs. 
Operational Costs 
% Total annual labor costs (including 
benefits) expressed as a percentage 
of total annual operational costs. 
13.2 Electrical Energy 
Costs as percentage of 
Operational Costs 
% Annual electrical energy costs 
expressed as a percentage of total 
annual operational costs. 
14.1 Contracted-out 
service costs as percentage 
of  operational costs 
% Total cost of services contracted-out 
to the private sector expressed as a 
percentage of total annual 
operational1 costs. 
Notes 
Note 1: Annual operating expenses exclude depreciation, interest and debt service 
Unit operational costs provide a “bottom line” assessment of the mix of resources 
used to achieve the outputs required. The preferred denominator related to 
operational costs is the amount of water sold.  This ratio then reflects the cost of 
providing water at the customer take off point.   
Lack of universal metering, lack of accurate household meters, and a focus in the 
past on water production mean that an alternative measure of operational cost 
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per cubic meter of water produced is also relevant in the short term.     
Staff costs are traditionally a major component of operating costs.  
Understanding staffing levels can often give a quick guide to the extent of any 
over-manning in a water utility.  While it is preferable to be able to allocate staff 
time to either water or wastewater services, this information is sometimes not 
available.  Comparisons are best made between utilities which offer the same 
scope of service both in terms of total size, and mix of water and sewer service.  
Note that where outside contractors are used (see indicator 14.1), staff number 
comparisons should take this into account. 
The number of people served per connection varies from country to country, and 
from utility to utility, depending on the housing stock and different approaches 
to service connections.  To facilitate international comparisons a denominator of 
population served has also been included. 
The relative importance of staff costs compared to total costs is captured in 
indicator 13.1.  Utilities are often over staffed and this measure provides insights 
into the impact of possible changes in future staff numbers. Indicator 14.1 
quantifies the degree to which outside (private) contractors are used to provide 
the utility service. 
QUALITY OF SERVICE 
INDICATOR 
UNIT DEFINITION 
15.1 Continuity of Service 
 
Hrs/day Average hours of service per day for 
water supply. 
15.2 Customers with 
discontinuous supply 
% The percentage of customers with a 
water supply that is discontinuous 
during normal operation. 
15.3 Quality of water 
supplied: nr of tests for 
residual chlorine 
% of # 
required 
The number of tests carried out on 
samples taken from the distribution 
system, as a % of the number 
required by the standard that 
applies. This may exceed 100%.  
NB: Operational samples, or any 
others that were not taken to check 
compliance with the standard, are 
excluded. 
15.4 Quality of water 
supplied: samples passing 
on residual chlorine 
% The percentage of samples tested for 
residual chlorine that pass the 
relevant standard 
16.1 Complaints about 
W&WW services 
% of 
W&WW 
conn 
Total number of W&WW 
complaints per year expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of 
W&WW connections 
17.1 Wastewater – at least 
primary treatment 
% Proportion of collected sewage that 
receives at least primary treatment, 
i.e. involving settlement with the 
intention of removing solids, but not 
biological treatment. Both lagoon 
and mechanical treatment can be 
included, where appropriate. 
17.2 Wastewater primary 
treatment only 
% Proportion of collected sewage that 
receives primary treatment only, i.e. 
involving settlement with the 
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intention of removing solids, but not 
biological treatment. Both lagoon 
and mechanical treatment can be 
included, where appropriate. 
17.3  Wastewater 
secondary treatment or 
better 
% Proportion of collected sewage that 
receives at least secondary 
treatment, i.e. removing oxygen 
demand as well as solids, normally 
biological. Both lagoon and 
mechanical treatment can be 
included, where appropriate. 
Notes 
Historically there has been limited attention paid to measures that capture the 
quality of service provided to customers.  This, in fact, should be a particular 
focus of performance measurement.   
The measures presented above are a limited first step in the process of capturing 
information on quality of service.  Complaints, while relatively easy to track, give 
only a glimpse of actual company performance - consumers may have become 
accustomed to poor service and not complain.  In other instances it may be 
difficult for customers to report complaints.  Capturing at least some customer 
derived data, however, is considered to be an important starting point. 
Collection of wastewater does not mean that the waste is fully treated before 
discharge back to the environment. The wastewater treatment indicators will 
provide an understanding of the amount of effluent that is treated before being 
discharged. 
A more comprehensive set of quality of service indicators could be developed but 
the likelihood of the data being collected by utility managers is limited in the 
short term. Expansion of the set is therefore a medium to long term objective.   
BILLING AND 
COLLECTIONS 
INDICATOR 
UNIT DEFINITION 
18.1 Average Revenue 
W&WW 
18.2 Average Revenue 
W&WW 
US$/m3 
water sold 
US$/W 
conn./yr. 
Total annual W&WW operating 
revenues expressed by annual 
amount of water sold and by the 
number of connections. 
18.3 Average Revenue – 
water only 
US$/m3 
water sold. 
Operating revenues (W only) 
expressed by annual amount of 
water sold. 
18.4 Revenue Split - % 
water 
18.5 Revenue Split - % 
wastewater 
% of total 
for W&WW 
Percentage split of total revenue into 
water and wastewater 
18.6 Water revenue – 
residential 
18.7 Water revenue – 
industrial/commercial 
18.8 Water revenue – 
institutions & others 
18.9 Water revenue – bulk 
treated supply 
% of total 
water 
revenue 
Percentage split of water revenue by 
customer type 
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18.10 Wastewater revenue 
per person served 
US$/person 
served 
Operating revenues (WW only) 
expressed per person served 
20.2 Residential fixed 
component of tariff 
20.5 Residential fixed 
component of tariff - water 
20.6 Residential fixed 
component of tariff - 
wastewater 
 
% of average 
bill 
Any fixed component of the 
residential tariff as a proportion of 
the average tariff per connection per 
year. 
Water & wastewater together, and 
separated if possible. 
21.1 Ratio of industrial to 
residential tariff 
21.2 Ratio of industrial to 
residential tariff - water 
21.3 Ratio of industrial to 
residential tariff - 
wastewater 
ratio The average charge (per m3) to 
industrial customers compared 
against the average charge (per m3) 
to residential customers. 
Water & wastewater together, and 
separated if possible. 
23.1 Collection Period Days (Year-end accounts receivable/Total 
annual operating revenues) * 365 
23.2 Collection ratio % Cash income / Billed revenue as a % 
Note 1. W = water service, WW = wastewater / sewerage service 
Notes 
Billing customers and getting paid are two different things.  The effectiveness of 
the collections process is measured by the amount of outstanding revenues at 
year end compared to the total billed revenue for the year, in day equivalents, 
and by the total amount collected as a percentage of the billed amount. 
FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
INDICATOR 
UNIT DEFINITION 
24.1 Operating Cost 
Coverage 
ratio Total annual operational 
revenues/Total annual operating 
costs 
25.1 Debt Service Ratio %  Cash income / Debt service * 100 
Notes 
These two indicators have been selected from a much larger range of financial 
indicators (which include leverage, liquidity, profitability and efficiency ratios). 
They help answer two important questions: (i) Do revenues exceed operating 
costs? and (ii) Does the utility’s income enable it to service its debts? 
ASSETS INDICATOR UNIT DEFINITION 
27.1 Gross Fixed Assets – 
water & wastewater 
US$/W&W
Wpop served 
Total gross fixed W&WW assets per 
W&WW populations served. 
27.2 Gross Fixed Assets - 
water 
27.3 Gross Fixed Assets – 
wastewater 
US$/W pop 
served 
US$/WW 
pop served 
Total gross fixed assets per 
population served, separately for 
water (W) and wastewater (WW). 
Note: Gross fixed assets are defined to include work in progress. 
Notes 
The capital intensity of the utility is indicated by the gross fixed asset value per 
capita served.  Unfortunately there is often limited information available about 
asset values and until more emphasis is placed on this item the values derived 
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must be treated with caution. 
No investment indicators are included as they tend to differ widely from one year 
to another due to the lumpiness of the investments. At a more detailed level, 
comparisons of unit costs for particular items of equipment can be very useful; 
but this is beyond the scope of IBNET. 
AFFORDABILITY OF 
SERVICES INDICATOR 
UNIT DEFINITION 
19.1 Total revenues per 
service pop/GNI 
 
19.2 Monthly water bill for 
a household consuming 
6m3 of water per month 
through a household or 
shared yard tap (but 
excluding the use of 
standposts)? 
% GNI per 
capita 
 
US$/year 
Total annual operating revenues per 
population served/National GNI per 
capita; expressed in percentage 
Cost in local currency to a household 
per month of 6m3 water / Exchange 
rate with US$ * 12 
20.1 Residential fixed 
component of tariff 
20.3 Residential fixed 
component of tariff - water 
20.4 Residential fixed 
component of tariff - 
wastewater 
 
US$/conn./ 
yr. 
Any fixed component of the 
residential tariff (total amount). 
Water & wastewater together, and 
separated if possible. 
20.2 Residential fixed 
component of tariff 
20.5 Residential fixed 
component of tariff - water 
20.6 Residential fixed 
component of tariff - 
wastewater 
 
% of average 
bill 
Any fixed component of the 
residential tariff as a proportion of 
the average tariff per connection per 
year. 
Water & wastewater together, and 
separated if possible. 
Notes 
Average tariffs need to be put in the perspective of affordability.  Household 
income data, however, is not easy to obtain.  The indicator selected here, 
therefore, compares average per capita tariffs as a proportion of per capita GNI.  
The GNI (Atlas method based)  will be for the whole country, and not reflect 
local variations, but is the most appropriate consistent measure currently 
available for most countries. In case specific household data is available, this data 
could be commented upon separately. 
Some utilities use fixed charge components within the residential tariff (i.e. 
irrespective of the amount of water consumed).  Such tariffs can adversely affect 
low volume water consumers.  They also protect the revenue stream to the utility 
in periods when consumption is highly variable.  Comparison of the fixed 
component with the average tariff will give an indication of the relative weight of 
the fixed and variable component of a water bill. 
There may be a cross subsidy between industrial consumers and residential 
consumers.  The ratio of the average charges (per m3) to industrial and 
residential customers provides some quantification of this subsidy.  Subsidies are 
complex and this ratio provides only a simplistic assessment of the situation in 
any utility. 
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For many, the cost of connecting to the piped network can be a significant 
financial hurdle.  Comparing connection charges will provide insights into the 
level to which this hurdle has been raised.  It is a particular issue when seeking 
to connect poorer sections of the community. The indicator provides the absolute 
level and as a proportion of national GNI per capita. 
PROCESS INDICATOR CATEGORIES 
P.1 What best describes the utility’s planning 
process? 
A. Setting budgets for next 
year 
B. A multi-year plan that 
identifies targets and 
resources for change and 
improvement 
C. Neither of the above 
(Describe....) 
The management of your utility undertakes the 
following: 
HR.1 Has a skills and training strategy for all 
staff? 
HR.2 Has an annual appraisal and target setting 
system for managers? 
HR.3 Has an annual appraisal and target setting 
system for all staff? 
HR.4 Has a reward and recognition program for 
all staff? 
HR.5 Has the ability to recruit and dismiss staff 
(within an agreed plan)? 
 
 
Yes / No 
 
Yes / No 
 
Yes / No 
 
Yes / No 
 
Yes / No 
R.1 Who has general oversight of the utility’s 
services and prices? 
A. Local, regional or 
national government 
department 
B. Independent board of 
stakeholders 
C. Independent service & 
price regulator 
D. Other (Describe....) 
What are the main sources of finance for 
investment? 
F.1 Grants or Government transfers to the 
utility? 
F.2 Borrowing from International Financial 
Agencies (multi or bi laterals)? 
F.3 Government owned banks? 
F.4 Commercial banks or bond holders? 
 
Yes / No 
Yes / No 
 
Yes / No 
Yes / No 
C.1 Does the utility offer more than one level of 
service for household or shared water supplies?1 
C.2 Does the utility offer more than one level of 
sanitation or sewerage service/ technology for 
households?2 
C.3 Does the utility offer a flexible / amortized 
repayment option to spread the costs of 
connection to the water and/or sanitation 
network? 
C.4 – See 19.2 
Yes / No / Not applicable 
 
Yes / No / Not applicable 
 
 
Yes / No / Not applicable 
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How does the utility find out the views of its 
customers? 
C.5.1  Letters, telephone calls etc from customers 
C.5.2 Inviting customers’ views through radio, 
TV or other publicity 
C.5.3  Questionnaire survey 
C.5.4  Other 
 
Yes / No 
Yes / No 
 
Yes / No 
Yes / No (Describe...) 
Context information 
Density of water connections #/km  
Density of sewer connections #/km  
The context factors are distinct from process indicators in that they are, in the 
short to medium term, beyond the influence of the utility. 
Information on the services provided is essential to interpreting the indicator 
values. The size of the Utility is also relevant, as large utilities can benefit from 
economies of scale. 
The connection density indicates whether the area served by the utility is dense 
and urban, or more dispersed. In areas where many households are not yet 
connected, it helps to assess the likely costs and benefits of extending the 
network.  
Note 1. Excluding free standpipes 
Note 2. Excluding free public toilets 
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APPENDIX B 
MATLAB CODE 
 
 
Uncontrolled Scenario 
 
tBegin=0; 
tEnd=100; 
dt=.01; 
 
t=tBegin:dt:tEnd; 
N=length(t); 
IC=1; 
mu=0.1; 
sigma=0.5; 
 
y=zeros(N,1); 
y(1)=IC; 
for i=2:length(y) 
   y(i)=y(i-1)+dt*(mu*y(i-1)*(10-y(i-1)))+sigma*sqrt(dt)*randn; 
end 
 
plot(t,y) 
ylabel('state of the system') 
        xlabel('time') 
        title("mu=0.05, sigma=0.5")     
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APPENDIX C 
MATLAB CODE 
 
 
Controlled Version with Defined Changes 
 
tEnd=1000; 
dt=.01; 
 
t=tBegin:dt:tEnd; 
N=length(t); 
IC=1; 
mu=0.005; 
sigma=0.1; 
b=1; 
u=0; 
du = 1; 
cnt=0; 
 
y=zeros(N,1); 
y(1)=IC; 
for i=2:length(y) 
if cnt == 50000 
u = u + du; 
cnt = 0; 
else 
cnt = cnt +1; 
endif 
   y(i)=y(i-1)+dt*(mu*y(i-1)*(10-y(i-1)))+dt*b*u+sigma*sqrt(dt)*randn; 
end 
 
plot(t,y) 
ylabel('state of the system') 
xlabel('time') 
title("Control with defined change") 
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APPENDIX D 
MATLAB CODE 
 
 
Controlled Version with Random Changes 
 
tEnd=1000; 
dt=.01; 
 
t=tBegin:dt:tEnd; 
N=length(t); 
IC=1; 
mu=0.005; 
sigma=0.1; 
b=1; 
u=0; 
du = u+du; 
cnt=0; 
 
y=zeros(N,1); 
y(1)=IC; 
for i=2:length(y) 
if cnt == 20000 
u = abs(randn); 
cnt = 0; 
else 
cnt = cnt +1; 
endif 
   y(i)=y(i-1)+dt*(mu*y(i-1)*(10-y(i-1)))+dt*b*u+sigma*sqrt(dt)*randn; 
end 
 
plot(t,y) 
ylabel('state of the system') 
xlabel('time') 
title("Control with random change")  
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APPENDIX E 
 
Cash Flow Parameter Definition/Assumptions 
Costs 
Variable costs, range from 20-40%, based on 
financing arrangement with vendor and community 
Present Value Real discount rate of 7.1% 
Total PV Cumulative total of present value  
Population 
The initial population is 237 with a 2% annual 
growth rate 
Water Pumped Cumulative total of water pumped in m3 
Water produced per month Water pumped per month in m3 
Assumed cost per m3  Assumed maximum cost per m3  
Actual cost per m3 and month Actual monthly cost / water pumped in that month 
Investment per person Total present value cost per person 
Total Investment 
Investment per person * population (same as Total 
PV) 
Volume of water production/per 
person and day in m3 
Water produced/population 
Cost of volume of water produced 
per day 
Water produced per month * water cost 
Daily water demand per person 
(m3) 
Random value between 15 and 20 Liter. 
Monthly water demand in m3 Daily water demand * days per month * population 
Water cost Total PV/water pumped (cumulative) 
Moving average 
The average cost of water from the initial month to 
the current month 
Cost of daily water demand  Water cost * daily demand of water per person 
Cost of daily water demand 
 Water cost * daily demand of water per 
person*population 
Assumed max cost  Maximum cost taken from initial model case 
Assumed max cost per day and 
person 
Maximum cost/days per month*population 
Actual cost  
Monthly amortization of initial project cost + 
monthly costs+ previous unfunded liability + 
present value for the time period 
Project balance Cumulative Assumed cash income – present value 
Actual cost per day and person Actual cost/population*days per month  
Months left in project The time period remaining in the cash flow  
Amount billed 
Rule based decision based on project costs (see 
detailed discussion in 6.6. 
Unfunded liability forward billing 
Cumulative difference of cash income and actual 
cost if billed amount was not met. 
Billed cost per day per person Amount billed/population*days per month 
Assumed cash income  Amount billed * Willingness to Pay 
Net income Assumed cash income – actual costs 
Unfunded liability Present value of amount billed – assumed cash 
income 
Debt Service Ratio (percent) Assumed cash income/actual cost 
Project Financing loss /gain 
amount 
 Sum of assumed cash income – Sum of total 
present cost 
Project financing loss/gain in 
percent 
project financing loss/gain amount*100/sum of total 
present value 
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Revenue offset factor 
                               
                                
                 (             
               ) 
Percentage of passing water 
standards 
Stochastic modeling of water quality degradation 
with time 
Additional investment – Water 
quality  
The additional investment amount needed in a year 
if the water quality standard falls below 87% 
Average household income 
The average household income per month and 
person 
Billed cost/income 
Billed cost per day per person/average household 
income per day 
Annual water operating 
costs/population served 
 Present Value/population 
Willingness to Pay (WTP) 
Ranges stepwise from 0 to 100% depending on the 
fraction of billed cost/income and fluctuates 
randomly: 
 
Billed cost over income Willingness to pay 
[0..0.01[    100-95% 
[0.01….03[    100-85% 
[0.03..0.05[    95-70% 
[0.05..0.07[    80-65% 
[0.07..   0% 
Disturbance 
Models random project cost between 0 to 55 USD 
per month for most month and 0 to 300 USD for a 
minor random fraction over the course of the project 
Actual - assumed cost Actual cost – assumed cost 
Actual cost - income Actual cost – assumed cash income 
Operational cash flow measure Performance measure as described in Chapter 6.6 
Setpoint Reference setpoint (ideal water project) 
Error Setpoint – operational cash flow 
Accumulated error Current error + previous error balance 
K 
Proportional gain that causes a change to the 
output proportional to the current error value 
Ti 
Integral term is the sum of the direct error over 
time giving the accumulated offset that should have 
been corrected earlier 
Td 
Derivative gain that considers the rate of change of 
the error  
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